Reconsideration of the current Japanese cabinet system from the point of view of constitutional history and comparative constitution

研究代表者publisher機関番号:34419; 研究種目：若手研究(B); 研究期間：2010～2012; 課題番号：22730033; 研究分野：社会科学; 科研費の分科・細目：法学・公法学研究成果の概要（和文）： イギリス、ドイツと比較した場合、日本の首相は、組織上の優位性が明確であるにもかかわらず、運営上の優越性が説かれることがなかった。それは、連帯責任から閣議の議決における全員一致を導く見解が強かったことに表れている。また、実務上も、主導的に運営できるのだとの認識が弱い。このことは、閣議を実質的な議論、意見交換の場としたり、閣議に代わる委員会制度を整えたりすることがなかったことや、首相を側で支えて各省を統合する官邸機能が弱いことに表れている。また、行政各部との関係では、従来、指揮監督権(憲法72条)の主体が内閣にあり、首相は閣議決定がなければ行政各部を指揮監督できないことが議論の中心であったが、ロッキード事件最高裁判決によって、少なくとも基本的な方針について閣議決定があれば首相は指揮監督権を行使しうること、また閣議決定がなくても「指示」は可能であることが示されており、この点はイギリスやドイツの場合と大きな違いはないことが明らかとなった。むしろ、首相には各省の組織編制権がないこと、各省の上級公務員の任命権が内閣レベルに存在しないことこそが日本の特徴であり、いわゆる行政割拠主義の弊害を産み出している原因ではないかと思われる。しかし、イギリスの連帯責任の観念に照らせば、日本において、連帯責任から意思決定における全員一致を憲法上の要請と解することに必然性はない。むしろ、憲法が明記する首相の組織上の優位性を、内閣の運営にも反映させて、内閣での政策形成における首相の指導的地位を正面から認めるべきである。また、いわゆる各省割拠主義も、憲法上の根拠があるものではない。ただ、各省の設置が法定主義であり改編が困難であること、各省の職員の人事権が各省大臣、実質的には各省の幹部職員にあるために人事が各省単位で行われていることから醸成されているように思われる。それゆえ、これらの点を改めることが、行政各部が「行政権」をもつ内閣の下にあるという憲法の構造に合致すると考えられる。 研究成果の概要（英文）： I could point out the following facts and analysis on the characteristics and problems of Japanese cabinet system as a result of comparative study with British and German cabinet system. The Japanese Prime Minister has not been considered to be superior to other members in managing the Cabinet, although it is clear that the PM is located in superior status to other Ministers of State in organization principles. In theory, it has been common to think that decision-makings in the Cabinet should be strictly unanimous, due to the collective responsibility. In practice, it has not been well recognized that the PM shall have strong leadership in the Cabinet. This analysis could be supported by the following facts: the Cabinet meetings have been just rubber-stamp ceremonies to decisions already made in other places; cabinet committee system has not been developed with the intention of shaping effective policy-making processes on the level of the Cabinet; the function of Kantei, groups of people close to and supporting the PM in his official buildings, has been too week. In relation with the central departments, it has been often pointed out that the main issue is the interpretation of the Article 72 of the Japanese Constitution 1946: the PM can direct each department without any Cabinet decisions or not. However, the decision of the Supreme Court grand bench in 1995 (Lockheed Case) showed that the PM can direct departments only with prior Cabinet decision with general principles and that the PM can ask them to do something without any prior Cabinet decision. In this point, the PM's power is not different from the British Prime Minister or German Kanzler. What has caused one of serious problems in the Japanese government, sectionalism of departments, might be that the PM (or the Cabinet) has neither the power of departments reorganisation nor the power of senior civil service appointments, rather than lack of the power of direction with legal force. Conclusions and arguments of this study is the following: unanimity principle in the Cabinet can't be reached by the interpretation of "collective responsibility"; it should be recognized that the PM shall have leadership in managing the Cabinet, as the structural interpretation of the Japanese Constitution, due to the superior status in shaping the Cabinet; "departments' sectionalism" shall not be based on the Japanese Constitution principles. This "custom" has been strengthened by the rules that the structure of departments should be regulated not by the Cabinet Orders but by Acts, and that each Minister has the personnel power of civil service in the ministerial department. Changes of these rules shall be consistent with the whole structure of the Japanese Constitution