<p>Number of cooperators as a function of time for (a) and (b) . The data are obtained from simulations and the lines come from numerical solutions. The parameters are , and . Each data point represents an average over 1000 time steps. (c) Distributions for different values of . The data points are simulation results and the lines are analytic results.</p
<p>In the first plots, A) and B), the opinion update is based on the payoff obtained in the last rou...
<p>According to <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0088412#pone.0...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the time evolution of average values of multiplication factor in the whole popu...
<p>Other parameters are fixed as and . The simulation lasts for time steps. The black squares and ...
<p><a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0049663#s2" target="_blank"...
<p>(a) fixed distribution, (b) uniform distribution, (c) exponential distribution and (d) power-law ...
<p>Parameter choices are , , and simulations were performed on a lattice. Trajectories are average...
<p>The parameters are , , and . The simulation was carried out for time steps. Each data point is ...
<p>Frequency of extinction (over 1000 simulation runs) as a function of the benefit-to-cost ratio of...
Here the increasing number of cooperators does not lead to increasing productivity, inasmuch as the ...
<p>This plot shows the impact of the multiplier (see eqn. 1) on the final average proportion of coo...
<p>Percentage of cooperators with respect to time for 2 different initial conditions for 5 runs and ...
Game payoffs (top) and basal resource acquisition (bottom) of cooperators (blue circles) and defecto...
<p>The system size is and the mutation rates are and , respectively. Simulation lasts for time st...
<p>Percentage of cooperators with respect to time for 4 different initial conditions for 5 runs and ...
<p>In the first plots, A) and B), the opinion update is based on the payoff obtained in the last rou...
<p>According to <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0088412#pone.0...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the time evolution of average values of multiplication factor in the whole popu...
<p>Other parameters are fixed as and . The simulation lasts for time steps. The black squares and ...
<p><a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0049663#s2" target="_blank"...
<p>(a) fixed distribution, (b) uniform distribution, (c) exponential distribution and (d) power-law ...
<p>Parameter choices are , , and simulations were performed on a lattice. Trajectories are average...
<p>The parameters are , , and . The simulation was carried out for time steps. Each data point is ...
<p>Frequency of extinction (over 1000 simulation runs) as a function of the benefit-to-cost ratio of...
Here the increasing number of cooperators does not lead to increasing productivity, inasmuch as the ...
<p>This plot shows the impact of the multiplier (see eqn. 1) on the final average proportion of coo...
<p>Percentage of cooperators with respect to time for 2 different initial conditions for 5 runs and ...
Game payoffs (top) and basal resource acquisition (bottom) of cooperators (blue circles) and defecto...
<p>The system size is and the mutation rates are and , respectively. Simulation lasts for time st...
<p>Percentage of cooperators with respect to time for 4 different initial conditions for 5 runs and ...
<p>In the first plots, A) and B), the opinion update is based on the payoff obtained in the last rou...
<p>According to <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0088412#pone.0...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the time evolution of average values of multiplication factor in the whole popu...