<p>According to <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0088412#pone.0088412.e164" target="_blank">Eq. (8)</a>, we obtain that when , the analytical results of respectively, which are marked out by arrows in the plot. For all the three line in the plot, we set , , , , , , , , , and . The simulation results show that the initial frequency of cooperators increases with increasing of . Large narrows the attraction basin of cooperation, which makes the flourishing of cooperation difficult.</p
<p>Results are presented for the traditional version (dotted line) and inferring reputation mechanis...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the fraction of cooperators in the whole population as a function of time for f...
<p>This plot shows the impact of the multiplier (see eqn. 1) on the final average proportion of coo...
<p>It is interesting to observe that too high initial values of may act detrimental on the evolutio...
<p>(a) Fraction of cooperators as a function of temptation to defect for population density and (...
<p>The plot shows the evolution of the number of cooperators over a typical run (see also <a href="h...
<p>It can be observed that the higher the temptation to defect , the lower the fraction of new links...
We investigate the influence of initial fraction of cooperators on the evolution of cooperation in s...
The depicted results are obtained for M = 1 and K = 0.5. The curves show that the proportion of coop...
We investigate the influence of initial fraction of cooperators on the evolution of cooperation in s...
<p>On the top panel (a), corresponding players on two networks always have the same coupling strengt...
<p><a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0049663#s2" target="_blank"...
<p>The system size is and the mutation rates are and , respectively. Simulation lasts for time st...
<p>It can be observed that intermediate values of are optimal for the evolution of cooperation, alb...
<p>The panels for the first two rows denote the distribution of cooperators and defectors for the up...
<p>Results are presented for the traditional version (dotted line) and inferring reputation mechanis...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the fraction of cooperators in the whole population as a function of time for f...
<p>This plot shows the impact of the multiplier (see eqn. 1) on the final average proportion of coo...
<p>It is interesting to observe that too high initial values of may act detrimental on the evolutio...
<p>(a) Fraction of cooperators as a function of temptation to defect for population density and (...
<p>The plot shows the evolution of the number of cooperators over a typical run (see also <a href="h...
<p>It can be observed that the higher the temptation to defect , the lower the fraction of new links...
We investigate the influence of initial fraction of cooperators on the evolution of cooperation in s...
The depicted results are obtained for M = 1 and K = 0.5. The curves show that the proportion of coop...
We investigate the influence of initial fraction of cooperators on the evolution of cooperation in s...
<p>On the top panel (a), corresponding players on two networks always have the same coupling strengt...
<p><a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0049663#s2" target="_blank"...
<p>The system size is and the mutation rates are and , respectively. Simulation lasts for time st...
<p>It can be observed that intermediate values of are optimal for the evolution of cooperation, alb...
<p>The panels for the first two rows denote the distribution of cooperators and defectors for the up...
<p>Results are presented for the traditional version (dotted line) and inferring reputation mechanis...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the fraction of cooperators in the whole population as a function of time for f...
<p>This plot shows the impact of the multiplier (see eqn. 1) on the final average proportion of coo...