Game payoffs (top) and basal resource acquisition (bottom) of cooperators (blue circles) and defectors (red squares). Equilibrium predictions for payoffs of cooperators (solid orange line) and defectors (dashed purple line) are also shown (top). The equilibrium prediction for basal resource acquisition for cooperators and defectors is the same and is shown by a solid orange line (bottom). In (a) a mixed non-viscous (q = 1) population, in (b) a structured non-viscous population, in (c) a viscous (q = 0.1) mixed population, and in (d) a structured viscous population is shown. While in a non-viscous population, payoffs and basal resource acquisition of cooperators and defectors are the same, in a viscous population, cooperators obtain a higher...
<p>(a) fixed distribution, (b) uniform distribution, (c) exponential distribution and (d) power-law ...
<p>The game has three strategies: cooperators contribute to the common pool, defectors exploit coope...
<p>Panels depict results for all players (a,d), for players adopting rewiring (b,e), and for players...
The density, ρ, (a), fraction of cooperators, m, (b), the density of cooperators, ρC, (c), and the d...
<p>The intersection of with horizontal line (dashed line) represents the values of fraction of coo...
We calculate the equilibrium fraction of cooperators in a population in which payoffs accrue from pl...
<p>The lines embedded with solid triangle, square, and circle represent the evolutionary trajectorie...
The collective cooperation dilemma, where players are involved in a public goods game and must decid...
<p>(a) Snapshots of distributions of cooperators and defectors at different time steps in the absenc...
<p>In all panels the cooperators are depicted blue while defectors are depicted red. Each small squa...
(a) Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators Fc for different strengths of the preferential sel...
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) gam...
The density of cooperators, ρC, A, the density of soft strategies in game B, ρd, B, the normalized p...
<p>The plot shows the evolution of the number of cooperators over a typical run (see also <a href="h...
<p>Parameter space of social dilemmas in well-mixed populations with the cost-to-benefit ratio as t...
<p>(a) fixed distribution, (b) uniform distribution, (c) exponential distribution and (d) power-law ...
<p>The game has three strategies: cooperators contribute to the common pool, defectors exploit coope...
<p>Panels depict results for all players (a,d), for players adopting rewiring (b,e), and for players...
The density, ρ, (a), fraction of cooperators, m, (b), the density of cooperators, ρC, (c), and the d...
<p>The intersection of with horizontal line (dashed line) represents the values of fraction of coo...
We calculate the equilibrium fraction of cooperators in a population in which payoffs accrue from pl...
<p>The lines embedded with solid triangle, square, and circle represent the evolutionary trajectorie...
The collective cooperation dilemma, where players are involved in a public goods game and must decid...
<p>(a) Snapshots of distributions of cooperators and defectors at different time steps in the absenc...
<p>In all panels the cooperators are depicted blue while defectors are depicted red. Each small squa...
(a) Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators Fc for different strengths of the preferential sel...
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) gam...
The density of cooperators, ρC, A, the density of soft strategies in game B, ρd, B, the normalized p...
<p>The plot shows the evolution of the number of cooperators over a typical run (see also <a href="h...
<p>Parameter space of social dilemmas in well-mixed populations with the cost-to-benefit ratio as t...
<p>(a) fixed distribution, (b) uniform distribution, (c) exponential distribution and (d) power-law ...
<p>The game has three strategies: cooperators contribute to the common pool, defectors exploit coope...
<p>Panels depict results for all players (a,d), for players adopting rewiring (b,e), and for players...