<p>In the first plots, A) and B), the opinion update is based on the payoff obtained in the last round of the game, while in C) and D) is based on the accumulated wealth. In A) and C), . The total population in the simulations is .</p
<p>(a)The fractions of agents in three groups are, respectively, 10%, 50%, and 40%; (b) The fraction...
<p> is fixed to the corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial contribution for all agents ...
We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each...
<p>The results are shown for three different values of the parameter : , and . Note that is the mo...
<p>(a) The fractions of agents in three groups are, respectively, 1%, 79%, and 20%; (b) The fraction...
The density of strategies who play up with cooperators u(C), down with cooperators d(C), up with def...
The time average density of different strategies, as a function of the probability of error in infer...
The density of cooperators, ρC, A, the normalized payoff difference of cooperators and defectors in ...
The population structure is a random regular graph with N = 1000, n = 2, and g1 = g2 = 3. In (a-c), ...
The density of cooperators, ρC, A, the density of soft strategies in game B, ρd, B, the normalized p...
<p>In A), the fraction of collaborators as function of the parameter . In B) and C) the opinion dis...
<p>For each example, the initial opinion map is shown on the left-hand side (experimental data), and...
Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can ta...
<p>In all three runs, the opinions are restricted to values between −250 and 250, and all agents hol...
We study an n-agent averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances...
<p>(a)The fractions of agents in three groups are, respectively, 10%, 50%, and 40%; (b) The fraction...
<p> is fixed to the corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial contribution for all agents ...
We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each...
<p>The results are shown for three different values of the parameter : , and . Note that is the mo...
<p>(a) The fractions of agents in three groups are, respectively, 1%, 79%, and 20%; (b) The fraction...
The density of strategies who play up with cooperators u(C), down with cooperators d(C), up with def...
The time average density of different strategies, as a function of the probability of error in infer...
The density of cooperators, ρC, A, the normalized payoff difference of cooperators and defectors in ...
The population structure is a random regular graph with N = 1000, n = 2, and g1 = g2 = 3. In (a-c), ...
The density of cooperators, ρC, A, the density of soft strategies in game B, ρd, B, the normalized p...
<p>In A), the fraction of collaborators as function of the parameter . In B) and C) the opinion dis...
<p>For each example, the initial opinion map is shown on the left-hand side (experimental data), and...
Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can ta...
<p>In all three runs, the opinions are restricted to values between −250 and 250, and all agents hol...
We study an n-agent averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances...
<p>(a)The fractions of agents in three groups are, respectively, 10%, 50%, and 40%; (b) The fraction...
<p> is fixed to the corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial contribution for all agents ...
We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each...
DOI
Add to ORKG