This letter provides additional information regarding the use of the TMI Unit 1 existing missile shield barrier to achieve the prompt closure requirement for the containment equipment hatch opening in the event of a Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment (FHAIC) during refueling activities, as described in Reference 1. TMI Unit 1 has reevaluated the closure methods for the containment equipment hatch opening and has determined that the existing missile shield barrier will be utilized in lieu of the originally proposed temporary cover design. The commitments regarding the defense-in-depth measures to promptly close the containment equipment hatch opening in the event of an FHAIC remain applicable to the use of the missile shield barrier. ...
ARMCO revetment walls are used as barricades to separate and prevent sympathetic detonation (SD) amo...
The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your applicati...
we reviewed the staff’s proposed draft final generic letter (GL) on the potential impact of debris b...
containment equipment door be closed during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel within c...
requires that the containment equipment door be closed during core alterations or movement of irradi...
containment requirements during handling of irradiated fuel and core alterations, " Revision 2,...
Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions. " Specifically, in that letter, ...
By letter dated May 8, 2001, you submitted for NRC review and approval a request to modify the Hatch...
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant. The amendment ...
The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has submitted a planned change request to use shielded containe...
The ASB review of the structures, systems, and components (SSC) to be protected from internally gene...
This report describes a method of refueling a nuclear reactor whereby the drive mechanism is disenga...
Station, Unit No. 2. The amendment established system operability requirements for the transfer func...
To prepare for the planned Contained Firing Facility at the LLNL Site 300, we investigated various m...
The following areas relating to procedures utilized in the design of seismic Category I structures, ...
ARMCO revetment walls are used as barricades to separate and prevent sympathetic detonation (SD) amo...
The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your applicati...
we reviewed the staff’s proposed draft final generic letter (GL) on the potential impact of debris b...
containment equipment door be closed during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel within c...
requires that the containment equipment door be closed during core alterations or movement of irradi...
containment requirements during handling of irradiated fuel and core alterations, " Revision 2,...
Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions. " Specifically, in that letter, ...
By letter dated May 8, 2001, you submitted for NRC review and approval a request to modify the Hatch...
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant. The amendment ...
The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has submitted a planned change request to use shielded containe...
The ASB review of the structures, systems, and components (SSC) to be protected from internally gene...
This report describes a method of refueling a nuclear reactor whereby the drive mechanism is disenga...
Station, Unit No. 2. The amendment established system operability requirements for the transfer func...
To prepare for the planned Contained Firing Facility at the LLNL Site 300, we investigated various m...
The following areas relating to procedures utilized in the design of seismic Category I structures, ...
ARMCO revetment walls are used as barricades to separate and prevent sympathetic detonation (SD) amo...
The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your applicati...
we reviewed the staff’s proposed draft final generic letter (GL) on the potential impact of debris b...