Add to ORKGWe present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index for the case where issues are elements of two-dimensional space. This characterization employs a version of the transfer condition, which enables us to unravel a spatial game into spatial games connected to unanimity games. The other axioms are spatial versions of anonymity and dummy, and two conditions concerned particularly with the spatial positions of the players. We show that these axioms are logically independent
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behavior of th...
Abstract: The Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share the total worth of ...
ABSTRACT. This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of the Owen set of transportation games....
We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index for the case where ...
We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index for the case where ...
Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 19...
This chapter reviews some results from the literature in which power indices related to the Shapley ...
In the class of complete games, the Shapley index of power is the characteristic invariant of the gr...
The multi-modal logic S4u, known in the field of qualitative spatial reasoning to be a decidable for...
Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games, in which players are assumed to fa...
Model comparison games can be used not only to decide whether two specic models are equivalent or no...
We present Spatial P systems, a variant of P systems which embodies the concept of space and positio...
It is shown that the Shapley value of any given game v is characterized by applying the value axioms...
On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games∗ Rene ́ van den Brink†, Miklós Pintér
Recently, cooperative game theory has been applied to various economic allocation problems in which ...
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behavior of th...
Abstract: The Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share the total worth of ...
ABSTRACT. This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of the Owen set of transportation games....
We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index for the case where ...
We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index for the case where ...
Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 19...
This chapter reviews some results from the literature in which power indices related to the Shapley ...
In the class of complete games, the Shapley index of power is the characteristic invariant of the gr...
The multi-modal logic S4u, known in the field of qualitative spatial reasoning to be a decidable for...
Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games, in which players are assumed to fa...
Model comparison games can be used not only to decide whether two specic models are equivalent or no...
We present Spatial P systems, a variant of P systems which embodies the concept of space and positio...
It is shown that the Shapley value of any given game v is characterized by applying the value axioms...
On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games∗ Rene ́ van den Brink†, Miklós Pintér
Recently, cooperative game theory has been applied to various economic allocation problems in which ...
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behavior of th...
Abstract: The Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share the total worth of ...
ABSTRACT. This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of the Owen set of transportation games....