Add to ORKGIn the class of complete games, the Shapley index of power is the characteristic invariant of the group of automorphisms, for these are exactly the permutations of players preserving the index
It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and s...
ED EPSInternational audienceThe Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share t...
Assuming a 'spectrum' or ordering of the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum i...
This chapter reviews some results from the literature in which power indices related to the Shapley ...
Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 19...
It is shown that the Shapley value of any given game v is characterized by applying the value axioms...
In this study, we introduce and examine the Egalitarian property for some power indices on the class...
We address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with exter...
An issue game is a combination of a monotonic simple game and an issue profile. An issue profile is ...
Abstract. In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way ...
Transferable utility games with an additional power structure on the coalitions are considered. This...
ABSTRACT. We study a basic sequential model for the formation of winning coalitions in a simple game...
Abstract: The Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share the total worth of ...
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness proper...
We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index for the case where ...
It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and s...
ED EPSInternational audienceThe Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share t...
Assuming a 'spectrum' or ordering of the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum i...
This chapter reviews some results from the literature in which power indices related to the Shapley ...
Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 19...
It is shown that the Shapley value of any given game v is characterized by applying the value axioms...
In this study, we introduce and examine the Egalitarian property for some power indices on the class...
We address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with exter...
An issue game is a combination of a monotonic simple game and an issue profile. An issue profile is ...
Abstract. In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way ...
Transferable utility games with an additional power structure on the coalitions are considered. This...
ABSTRACT. We study a basic sequential model for the formation of winning coalitions in a simple game...
Abstract: The Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share the total worth of ...
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness proper...
We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index for the case where ...
It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and s...
ED EPSInternational audienceThe Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share t...
Assuming a 'spectrum' or ordering of the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum i...