It is shown that the Shapley value of any given game v is characterized by applying the value axioms-efficiency, symmetry, the null player axiom, and either additivity or strong positivity-to the additive group generated by the game v itself and its subgames
In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomat...
International audienceThis short study reports an application of the Shapley value axioms to a new c...
The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts of cooperative game theory is defined an...
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness proper...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and s...
The impressive amount of papers concerning the Shapley value, seems to well reflect the success of t...
textabstractn this paper we provide new axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU-games using axio...
It is proved that Young's axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symme...
In this paper we study a family of efficient, symmetric and linear values for TU-games, described by...
In 1996, Felsenthal and Machover proposed a bargaining procedure for a valuable payoff in cooperativ...
The Shapley value, one of the most widespread concepts in operations Research applications of cooper...
Motivated by a case of discrimination against some particular players happened in the real world, we...
The Shapley value is a compensation scheme that distributes the surplus of a joint work among its di...
In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomat...
International audienceThis short study reports an application of the Shapley value axioms to a new c...
The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts of cooperative game theory is defined an...
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness proper...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and s...
The impressive amount of papers concerning the Shapley value, seems to well reflect the success of t...
textabstractn this paper we provide new axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU-games using axio...
It is proved that Young's axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symme...
In this paper we study a family of efficient, symmetric and linear values for TU-games, described by...
In 1996, Felsenthal and Machover proposed a bargaining procedure for a valuable payoff in cooperativ...
The Shapley value, one of the most widespread concepts in operations Research applications of cooper...
Motivated by a case of discrimination against some particular players happened in the real world, we...
The Shapley value is a compensation scheme that distributes the surplus of a joint work among its di...
In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomat...
International audienceThis short study reports an application of the Shapley value axioms to a new c...
The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts of cooperative game theory is defined an...
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