In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-...
This paper outlines a light approach to heavy issues of consciousness. The basic claim is that human...
The ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine 1983) refers to a gap between physical and phenomenal explanations of...
it's not clear to me that by taking Siewert's first-person approach, we can come to grasp ...
In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is ...
I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-...
In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that ...
This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information proces...
We argue for the possibility of validating the presence of consciousness in another person from a pe...
The author discusses the problem of integration of first- and third-person approaches in studying th...
This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle’s and Dennett’s can bet...
Modern science was born when physicists started studying phenomena by recruiting mathematical explan...
Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel huma...
Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel huma...
Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in c...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com Copyright SpringerMuch of the difficul...
This paper outlines a light approach to heavy issues of consciousness. The basic claim is that human...
The ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine 1983) refers to a gap between physical and phenomenal explanations of...
it's not clear to me that by taking Siewert's first-person approach, we can come to grasp ...
In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is ...
I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-...
In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that ...
This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information proces...
We argue for the possibility of validating the presence of consciousness in another person from a pe...
The author discusses the problem of integration of first- and third-person approaches in studying th...
This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle’s and Dennett’s can bet...
Modern science was born when physicists started studying phenomena by recruiting mathematical explan...
Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel huma...
Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel huma...
Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in c...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com Copyright SpringerMuch of the difficul...
This paper outlines a light approach to heavy issues of consciousness. The basic claim is that human...
The ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine 1983) refers to a gap between physical and phenomenal explanations of...
it's not clear to me that by taking Siewert's first-person approach, we can come to grasp ...