We argue for the possibility of validating the presence of consciousness in another person from a perspective that blends both, a third-person approach of coming close to, observing, and understanding the other; and a first-person assessment of how the experience of the other feels like. For this, we will need to explain how the line between the third-person and first-person approaches is blurred in some methodological approaches. We rest our position largely on the back of some seminal conclusions of the meditations of Ren\'e Descartes and other theories concerning consciousness like Chalmers' naturalistic dualism and, to some secondary extent on Integrated Information Theory (IIT). Additionally, we describe fundamental contextual principl...
The readings in Velmans (ed.) (2000) Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness were developed from an I...
Two main open questions in current consciousness research concern (i) the neural correlates of consc...
Phenomenal conscious experience – the subjective ‘what-it-feels-like’ – can be explored through two ...
Modern science was born when physicists started studying phenomena by recruiting mathematical explan...
This overview of Consciousness Studies examines the conditions that one has to satisfy to establish ...
Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in c...
Classical theories of consciousness make it difficult to see how it can be a subject of scientific s...
This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information proces...
This chapter re-examines the basic conditions required for a study of conscious experiences in the l...
I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-...
While first-person methods are essential for a science of consciousness, it is controversial what fo...
In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is ...
By and large, if we follow the current discussions on consciousness in the West we get two impressio...
Abstract. This is a prepublication version of the final chapter from the Blackwell Companion to Cons...
In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that ...
The readings in Velmans (ed.) (2000) Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness were developed from an I...
Two main open questions in current consciousness research concern (i) the neural correlates of consc...
Phenomenal conscious experience – the subjective ‘what-it-feels-like’ – can be explored through two ...
Modern science was born when physicists started studying phenomena by recruiting mathematical explan...
This overview of Consciousness Studies examines the conditions that one has to satisfy to establish ...
Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in c...
Classical theories of consciousness make it difficult to see how it can be a subject of scientific s...
This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information proces...
This chapter re-examines the basic conditions required for a study of conscious experiences in the l...
I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-...
While first-person methods are essential for a science of consciousness, it is controversial what fo...
In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is ...
By and large, if we follow the current discussions on consciousness in the West we get two impressio...
Abstract. This is a prepublication version of the final chapter from the Blackwell Companion to Cons...
In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that ...
The readings in Velmans (ed.) (2000) Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness were developed from an I...
Two main open questions in current consciousness research concern (i) the neural correlates of consc...
Phenomenal conscious experience – the subjective ‘what-it-feels-like’ – can be explored through two ...