Add to ORKGThis article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly
A standard critique of the strategic, two-stage industrial and trade policy models is that trade pol...
We investigate government subsidy policies in which a home firm and a foreign firm choose to strateg...
We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants ...
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home ...
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home ...
In the Eaton and Grossman (1986) model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welf...
In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to...
In the Eaton and Grossman (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383–406) model of export ...
This paper examines strategic subsidy/tax policy in a third-country market model with a monopoly ca...
In the Eaton and Grossman (1986) Bertrand duopoly model of strategic export taxes, both countries ma...
In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to...
This article derives the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under Bertrand duopol...
In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or...
[[abstract]]In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if ...
This paper analyses whether a welfare maximizing government should tax or subsidize the home firms ...
A standard critique of the strategic, two-stage industrial and trade policy models is that trade pol...
We investigate government subsidy policies in which a home firm and a foreign firm choose to strateg...
We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants ...
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home ...
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home ...
In the Eaton and Grossman (1986) model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welf...
In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to...
In the Eaton and Grossman (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383–406) model of export ...
This paper examines strategic subsidy/tax policy in a third-country market model with a monopoly ca...
In the Eaton and Grossman (1986) Bertrand duopoly model of strategic export taxes, both countries ma...
In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to...
This article derives the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under Bertrand duopol...
In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or...
[[abstract]]In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if ...
This paper analyses whether a welfare maximizing government should tax or subsidize the home firms ...
A standard critique of the strategic, two-stage industrial and trade policy models is that trade pol...
We investigate government subsidy policies in which a home firm and a foreign firm choose to strateg...
We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants ...