In the Eaton and Grossman (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383–406) model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than welfare under free trade for both countries
In this paper we investigate the effectiveness and the welfare implications of various fiscal polici...
This paper considers the effect of exogenous trade bloc enlargement in a multicountry version of the...
This paper considers the effect of exogenous trade bloc enlargement in a multi-country version of th...
In the Eaton and Grossman (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383–406) model of export ...
In the Eaton and Grossman (1986) model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welf...
In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to...
In the Eaton and Grossman (1986) Bertrand duopoly model of strategic export taxes, both countries ma...
In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to...
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home ...
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home ...
This working paper is produced for discussion purpose only. These working papers are expected to be ...
In the literature on the welfare effects of free trade under imperfect competition, one important ca...
We examine the welfare and other consequences of tax policy in a third market export model where duo...
In the literature on the welfare effects of free trade under imperfect competition, one important ca...
This paper presents a model of unionized oligopoly under Bertrand competition to investigate the eff...
In this paper we investigate the effectiveness and the welfare implications of various fiscal polici...
This paper considers the effect of exogenous trade bloc enlargement in a multicountry version of the...
This paper considers the effect of exogenous trade bloc enlargement in a multi-country version of th...
In the Eaton and Grossman (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383–406) model of export ...
In the Eaton and Grossman (1986) model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welf...
In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to...
In the Eaton and Grossman (1986) Bertrand duopoly model of strategic export taxes, both countries ma...
In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to...
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home ...
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home ...
This working paper is produced for discussion purpose only. These working papers are expected to be ...
In the literature on the welfare effects of free trade under imperfect competition, one important ca...
We examine the welfare and other consequences of tax policy in a third market export model where duo...
In the literature on the welfare effects of free trade under imperfect competition, one important ca...
This paper presents a model of unionized oligopoly under Bertrand competition to investigate the eff...
In this paper we investigate the effectiveness and the welfare implications of various fiscal polici...
This paper considers the effect of exogenous trade bloc enlargement in a multicountry version of the...
This paper considers the effect of exogenous trade bloc enlargement in a multi-country version of th...
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