textThe economics literature has traditionally focused on anticompetitive incentives to explain why firms are motivated to bundle products. Yet these theories cannot always provide adequate explanations for firms’ bundling practices. Chapter Two studies non-exclusionary bundling of an add-on product with a core (or basic) product sold by a monopolist and finds that bundling can occur simply because sales of the products cannot be separated. Chapter Two also considers the case in which vertically non-integrated monopolists produce the individual products and finds that dual monopolists are more likely to price in such a way that all consumers buying the core good also buy the add-on than would arise with a single firm. When a monopolist desi...
I analyze the implications of bundling on price competition in a market for complementary products. ...
In a winner-take-all duopoly market for systems in which firms invest to improve their products, a m...
This paper proposes a model of competitive bundling with an arbitrary number of firms. In the regime...
textThe economics literature has traditionally focused on anticompetitive incentives to explain why ...
Abstract: This paper examines the role of costs in explaining why products are bundled and specifica...
A tying arrangement is a seller’s requirement that a customer may purchase its “tying” product only ...
This paper studies the incentives for multiproduct duopolists to sell their products as a bundle. I...
Firms often offer a variety of add-on products in addition to their core information goods. How shou...
In many markets, bundling, or the offering of two or more products in a package for a single price i...
Information goods, such as journal articles, are characterized by high fixed (first-copy) costs, but...
Information goods are characterized by high fixed (first-copy) costs, but very low costs for the pro...
According to the hypothesis of planned obsolescence, a durable goods monopolist without commitment p...
UnrestrictedThis dissertation studies a variety of bundling and discount strategies adopted by domin...
This paper investigates the strategic effect of bundling when a multi-product firm producing two com...
We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a ...
I analyze the implications of bundling on price competition in a market for complementary products. ...
In a winner-take-all duopoly market for systems in which firms invest to improve their products, a m...
This paper proposes a model of competitive bundling with an arbitrary number of firms. In the regime...
textThe economics literature has traditionally focused on anticompetitive incentives to explain why ...
Abstract: This paper examines the role of costs in explaining why products are bundled and specifica...
A tying arrangement is a seller’s requirement that a customer may purchase its “tying” product only ...
This paper studies the incentives for multiproduct duopolists to sell their products as a bundle. I...
Firms often offer a variety of add-on products in addition to their core information goods. How shou...
In many markets, bundling, or the offering of two or more products in a package for a single price i...
Information goods, such as journal articles, are characterized by high fixed (first-copy) costs, but...
Information goods are characterized by high fixed (first-copy) costs, but very low costs for the pro...
According to the hypothesis of planned obsolescence, a durable goods monopolist without commitment p...
UnrestrictedThis dissertation studies a variety of bundling and discount strategies adopted by domin...
This paper investigates the strategic effect of bundling when a multi-product firm producing two com...
We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a ...
I analyze the implications of bundling on price competition in a market for complementary products. ...
In a winner-take-all duopoly market for systems in which firms invest to improve their products, a m...
This paper proposes a model of competitive bundling with an arbitrary number of firms. In the regime...