Add to ORKGWoodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are sentient. Moreover, their neuroanatomy, although different from mammalian, is sufficiently complex to support sentience. I answer some potential objections to Woodruff’s argument, and try to trace its moral significance. In so doing, I briefly address Birch’s (2017) target article as well
Key (2016) argues that fish do not feel pain based on neuroanatomical evidence. I argue that Key mak...
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization a...
Key’s (2016) target article, “Why fish do not feel pain,” is based on a moralistic fallacy where con...
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are senti...
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is ...
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for consider...
In my target article, I argued that the brains of ray-finned fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinop...
Woodruff’s target article provides a detailed review of comparative studies on brain and behavior in...
Arguments for fish sentience have difficulty with the philosophical zombie problem. Progress in AI h...
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, be...
Woodruff concludes that ray-finned fishes (Actinopterygii) are sentient and that the pallium contrib...
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sent...
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid figh...
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal...
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-cons...
Key (2016) argues that fish do not feel pain based on neuroanatomical evidence. I argue that Key mak...
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization a...
Key’s (2016) target article, “Why fish do not feel pain,” is based on a moralistic fallacy where con...
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are senti...
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is ...
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for consider...
In my target article, I argued that the brains of ray-finned fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinop...
Woodruff’s target article provides a detailed review of comparative studies on brain and behavior in...
Arguments for fish sentience have difficulty with the philosophical zombie problem. Progress in AI h...
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, be...
Woodruff concludes that ray-finned fishes (Actinopterygii) are sentient and that the pallium contrib...
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sent...
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid figh...
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal...
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-cons...
Key (2016) argues that fish do not feel pain based on neuroanatomical evidence. I argue that Key mak...
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization a...
Key’s (2016) target article, “Why fish do not feel pain,” is based on a moralistic fallacy where con...