Add to ORKGContrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid fighting fish and trace memory in goldfish do not support claims about sentience. This is disputed by research results about learning and implicit processing, sleep, vegetative states, amnesia, semantic priming, artificial network modeling, and even insects. A novel, deflationary, interpretation of Grosenick et al.\u27s experiments on A. burtoni is also offered
In this paper I argue that Velmens’ reflexive model of perceptual consciousness is useful for unders...
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization a...
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) c...
In my target article, I argued that the brains of ray-finned fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinop...
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is ...
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-cons...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
I present a little-known example of flexible, opportunistic behavior by a species of fish to undermi...
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, be...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
Woodruff’s target article provides a detailed review of comparative studies on brain and behavior in...
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for consider...
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal...
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are senti...
Arguments for fish sentience have difficulty with the philosophical zombie problem. Progress in AI h...
In this paper I argue that Velmens’ reflexive model of perceptual consciousness is useful for unders...
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization a...
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) c...
In my target article, I argued that the brains of ray-finned fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinop...
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is ...
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-cons...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
I present a little-known example of flexible, opportunistic behavior by a species of fish to undermi...
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, be...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
Woodruff’s target article provides a detailed review of comparative studies on brain and behavior in...
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for consider...
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal...
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are senti...
Arguments for fish sentience have difficulty with the philosophical zombie problem. Progress in AI h...
In this paper I argue that Velmens’ reflexive model of perceptual consciousness is useful for unders...
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization a...
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) c...