Despotizem strasti ali zlo v naravi

In this paper the author gives a detailed critical discussion of the conditions of possibility of the politics and/or ethics of enjoyment such as that conceived by Sade. She begins by discussing the hypothesis advanced by a set of eminent interprets of Sade’s work according to which there is an irreducible antagonism between the disruptive passions and the social bond. She then goes on to discuss the central theme of this essay, namely, society rooted in the imperative of enjoyment, and then makes a number of remarks about the viability of such a project. As a consequence of this discussion, the author turns to the question of the evil inherent to enjoyment. She concludes that the entire project of the politics and ethics of enjoyment is centered around the deculpabilisation of passions and enjoyment since, in Sade, the evilness of enjoyment is imputed to Nature. It could thus be said, argues the author, that Nature is Sade’s “symptom”, denouncing in this way that Sade, the theorist of enjoyment, is unable and/or unwilling to assume the evilness of enjoyment.Pričujoči prispevek je kritični pretres pogojev možnosti politike in etike užitka, kot ju je koncipiral Sade. Avtorica začenja s kritiko hipoteze, ki jo zagovarja vrsta eminentnih Sadovih interpretov in po kateri naj bi obstajal ireduktibilen antagonizem med disruptivnimi strastmi in družbeno vezjo. V nadaljevanju avtorica razpravlja o centralni temi tega prispevka, namreč o družbi, zakoreninjeni v imperativu užitka in ob tem razvije vrsto pripomb o uresničljivosti takega projetka. Avtorica se nato obrne k vprašanju zla, inherentnega užitku. Prispevek sklene z ugotovitvijo, da je Sadov projekt politike in etike užitka osredinjen na dekulpabilizacijo strasti in užitka, kar je razvidno iz tega, da Sade zlo užitka pripiše naravi. Avtorica zato zatrdi, da je narava Sadov “simptom”, ki pokaže, da je Sade, teoretik užitka par excellence, nezmožen oziroma nepripravljen nase vzeti zlo v užitku