Kant: v kakšnem pomenu so sodbe okusa estetske?

The starting point of the article is Kant’s distinction between grammatical form of judgement and its logical form. The logical point in support of the claim that judgement of taste is aesthetical is the remark that judgement of taste does not subsume a representation in a concept. The judgement of taste itself does not postulate the agreement of everyone for that can only be done by a logically universal judgement because it can adduce reasons. By that we leans on Kant’s own distinction between judgements of perception and judgements of experience, introduced in Prolegomena. The thesis that judgements of taste are not subjected to the proof is related with Kant’s claim that the beauty pleases immidiately, that is, finding out that something is beautiful requires direct experience of an object. Kant speaks of the beautiful “as if beauty were characteristic of the object and the judgement logical, although it is only aesthetical and involves merely a reference of the representation of the object to the subject.” Aesthetic judgements are subjective in that their ground of determination lies in a sensation immidiately connected with the feeling of pleasure and pain. Feelings of pleasure or displeasure can never be properties of an object but only of the subject, his mental states. The judgements of taste are then a subspecies of the asthetical judgements. We notice them, phenomenologically, through our awareness of the feelings of pleasure or displeasure while perceiving an object. Such analysis of the judgement of taste as a aesthetical constitutes the thesis about antinomy of taste which needs – for its solution – transcendental deduction of taste.Naše izhodišče je Kantovo razločevanje med slovnično obliko sodbe in njeno logično obliko. Logična poanta v podporo trditvi, da so sodbe okusa estetske, je pripomba, da sodbe okusa ne povezujejo predstave s pojmom. Sodba okusa sama še ne postulira soglasja vsakogar, temveč to lahko stori le logična obča sodba, ker lahko navede razloge. Pri tem se po analogiji opiramo na Kantovo razločevanje med sodbami zaznavanja in sodbami izkustva iz Prolegomen. Teza, da sodbe okusa niso podvržene dokazu, je povezana s Kantovim pojmovanjem, da lepota ugaja takoj, neposredno, da odkritje nečesa lepega zahteva neposredno izkustvo predmeta. Po Kantu je dojemati smotrno urejeno stavbo nekaj popolnoma drugega kakor zavedati se te predstave s senzacijo ugajanja. V tem primeru povezujemo predstavo v celoti s subjektom, in sicer z njegovim življenjskim občutjem, ki ga imenujemo občutje ugodja in neugodja. Sodbe okusa so torej podvrsta estetski sodb; fenomenološko jih opazimo preko našega zavedanja občutja ugodja ali neugodja, ko zaznavamo predmet. To, da je predstava predmeta neposredno povezana z ugodjem, bi dalo zgolj empirično sodbo. Zdi se, da Kant navaja ta izkustvena dejstva kot evidenco za svojo trditev, da so sodbe okusa estetske. Sklep, h kateremu nas napeljuje, je, da je sodba okusa estetska, to je, da je o stanju subjekta, ki zaznavno ali čutno dojema predmet. Ta analiza sodbe okusa kot estetske tvori tezo o antinomiji okusa. Skupaj z analizo sodbe okusa kot nezainteresirane sodbe je ustvarjeno nasprotje, ki zahteva transcendentalno dedukcijo okusa. Torej ima trditev, da je sodba okusa estetska, osrednji pomen v nadaljnji argumentaciji Kritike presodne moči