This article draws a general picture of the differences between the metaphors of carrots and sticks. It discusses incentive effects (in principle, a $100 carrot creates the same incentives as a $100 stick, but there are exceptions); transaction costs (carrots are paid upon compliance, sticks upon violation, therefore sticks have lower transaction costs if the majority complies); risks (probabilistic carrots create risks for compliers, probabilistic sticks for violators); wealth and budget constraints (the maximum carrot depends on the principal's wealth, the maximum stick on the agent's wealth, but sticks can have a multiplication effect); distributive effects (carrots may overcompensate, sticks may undercompensate; individualizing sanction...
We examine rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer first makes an ...
In a sample of 59 LBOs from 1984 to 1989, this study shows that, on average, the CEO is awarded more...
We analyze an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine wheth...
While carrots and sticks create in principle identical marginal incentives, they are not randomly us...
There is a remarkable tendency in modern legal systems to increasingly use carrots. This trend is no...
This paper proposes the building blocks towards a general theory on the optimal use of carrots and s...
Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish (also referred to as stick) can...
Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated several times. ...
Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated several times. ...
This paper reports on the use of carrot (positive) and stick (negative) incentives as methods of inc...
This Article considers the second-best design of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies in the presence of ag...
This paper reports on the use of carrot (positive) and stick (negative) incentives as methods of inc...
Many sociologists and economists have maintained that costly sanctions are able to sustain cooperati...
We examine demands for rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer fir...
In this paper we report on a principal-agent experiment where the principal can choose whether to re...
We examine rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer first makes an ...
In a sample of 59 LBOs from 1984 to 1989, this study shows that, on average, the CEO is awarded more...
We analyze an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine wheth...
While carrots and sticks create in principle identical marginal incentives, they are not randomly us...
There is a remarkable tendency in modern legal systems to increasingly use carrots. This trend is no...
This paper proposes the building blocks towards a general theory on the optimal use of carrots and s...
Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish (also referred to as stick) can...
Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated several times. ...
Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated several times. ...
This paper reports on the use of carrot (positive) and stick (negative) incentives as methods of inc...
This Article considers the second-best design of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies in the presence of ag...
This paper reports on the use of carrot (positive) and stick (negative) incentives as methods of inc...
Many sociologists and economists have maintained that costly sanctions are able to sustain cooperati...
We examine demands for rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer fir...
In this paper we report on a principal-agent experiment where the principal can choose whether to re...
We examine rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer first makes an ...
In a sample of 59 LBOs from 1984 to 1989, this study shows that, on average, the CEO is awarded more...
We analyze an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine wheth...