There is a widespread intuition that knowledge is more valuable than any of its subparts. In the literature the need to show that this is the case is known as the secondary value problem. In this paper I propose to defend this intuition by solving the secondary value problem. In the first part of the paper I introduce and explain the problem I propose to solve. In the second part of the paper I discuss two objections to the very possibility of solving the secondary value problem. In parts three and four I attempt to solve the secondary value problem and respond to the two objections by setting forth a certain view of the nature of knowledge and the value of its subparts. The conclusion the paper aims at is that each constituent part o...
The paper addresses two fundamental issues in epistemic axiology. It argues primarily that curiosity...
A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology – one with origins in Plato’s Meno – concerns the valu...
An account of the nature of knowledge must explain the value of knowledge. I argue that modal condit...
There is a widespread intuition that knowledge is more valuable than any of its subparts. In the li...
ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are mor...
We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily s...
This paper concerns questions of value in regards to truth and knowledge. Beginning with a cursory o...
Why care about knowledge? One of the questions that is very rarely asked in epistemology concerns wh...
The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back t...
It is my overall aim in this work to defend the view that knowledge is no more valuable than true be...
ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary ’ and ‘Secondary ’ Value Problems for knowledge are m...
This paper concerns questions of value in regards to truth and knowledge. Beginning with a cursory o...
I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge...
According to the achievement account (AA) of the value of knowledge, knowledge is finally valuable ...
We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested b...
The paper addresses two fundamental issues in epistemic axiology. It argues primarily that curiosity...
A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology – one with origins in Plato’s Meno – concerns the valu...
An account of the nature of knowledge must explain the value of knowledge. I argue that modal condit...
There is a widespread intuition that knowledge is more valuable than any of its subparts. In the li...
ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are mor...
We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily s...
This paper concerns questions of value in regards to truth and knowledge. Beginning with a cursory o...
Why care about knowledge? One of the questions that is very rarely asked in epistemology concerns wh...
The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back t...
It is my overall aim in this work to defend the view that knowledge is no more valuable than true be...
ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary ’ and ‘Secondary ’ Value Problems for knowledge are m...
This paper concerns questions of value in regards to truth and knowledge. Beginning with a cursory o...
I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge...
According to the achievement account (AA) of the value of knowledge, knowledge is finally valuable ...
We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested b...
The paper addresses two fundamental issues in epistemic axiology. It argues primarily that curiosity...
A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology – one with origins in Plato’s Meno – concerns the valu...
An account of the nature of knowledge must explain the value of knowledge. I argue that modal condit...