Knowledge and Its Value: Some Suggestions as To Why Knowledge Is More Valuable Than True Belief

This paper concerns questions of value in regards to truth and knowledge. Beginning with a cursory outline of the value of truth, I then go on to investigate the value of knowledge in terms of a few specific questions collectively known as the value problem. These questions are prompted by consideration of the commonly held view that knowledge is of distinctive value. Firstly, knowledge seems to be more valuable than mere true belief. Secondly, given the value importance bestowed upon it, knowledge should have a greater value than anything which falls short of knowledge. Thirdly, does knowledge have not only a greater quantity, but also a different quality of value than whatever falls short of knowledge? I begin my response to the value problem by proffering a technical argument in support of the view that knowledge does have greater instrumental epistemic value than mere true belief. I then go on to consider a general way of explaining why knowledge has not just a greater amount of, but also a different kind of value than whatever falls short of knowledge. I conclude with a brief look at an alternative, revisionary response to the value problem. Truth is good. To begin with, it has instrumental value, as true belief is a primary factor i