<Articles>The Framework of Mori Tsutomu's Foreign Policy toward China during 1929-1932

英文要旨は92巻3号により差し替え済み満州事変は、満州における日本の権益が危機的な状況にあるにもかかわらず、ワシントン会議での合意を最大限尊重し列国協調主義、中国内政不干渉主義などを基軸とする幣原外交では擁護され得ないとして、引き起こされた。本稿は、幣原外交とは異なり、満蒙権益擁護を強く主張し強硬的な中国政策を展開した政友会森恪の中国政策構想並びにその位置づけを明らかにしようとするものである。考察によれば、森の中国政策は九カ国条約への違背、列国との摩擦を回避することを基軸としたものであり、その背景には森自身の「大国」志向と「皇室中心の国体」という日本国家観がある。このことを踏まえるならば、これまでの先行研究が森の中国政策の強硬的側面を強調し、否定的に捉えてきた潮流の再考を促すことになろう。また、森の中国政策を改めて検討・分析することで、幣原外交に替って日本がとり得る選択肢のひとつを探る手がかりが得られよう。Japanese foreign policy was carried out by Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro during the period of 1924 to 1931, except when the cabinet was headed by Tanaka Giichi (1927-1929). Shidehara's foreign policy toward China is said to have faithfully followed the agreements made at the Washington Conference in 1921 and to have respected both cooperation with the powers and the principle of nonintervention in China's internal affairs. The Manchuria Incident, which broke out in September 1931, was the work of the Kantogun, who perceived that Japanese national interests in Manchuria could not be secured by the policy executed by Shidehara. Some scholars have questioned whether his policy was the best method for defending Japanese national interests in Manchuria, because the agreements of the Washington Conference contained the seeds of turmoil and were fragile, such as the fact the Soviet Union was outside the Washington system and the nationalist movement in China etc. These scholars, however, give no indication which policies should have replaced those of Shidehara. This article focuses on Mori Tsutomu, an influential member of the Seiyukai, who advocated a hard line on China that was antithetical to Shidehara's, and clarifies the meaning of the framework of his foreign policy toward China in the period of the Manchuria Incident. In order to examine whether Mori's foreign policy could have been an alternative, I analyze Mori's conduct and remarks on the Nine Power Treaty, the League of Nations, the Chinese government, and Japanese national interests in Manchuria. The findings of this study can be summarized as follows. (1) Mori's policy was carefully designed not to infringe on the Nine Power Treaty and to avoid friction with the powers. His policy making as such derived from his belief that adopting a hard line and taking military action to settle international problems were inevitable when pursuing national interests, but he believed relations with the powers should not be ruptured. (2) His strong emphasis on defending Japanese interests in Manchuria derived from his aspiration for Japan to become a great nation, that Japan must "become a great nation and remain a great nation." Securing natural resources in Manchuria in his view was a prerequisite to being a great nation. This emphasis on the special relationship with Manchuria was in the context of the increasing radicalization of the nationalist movement on the Chinese mainland and the worry that this might endanger Japanese interests there. From his point of view, social order and stability must be maintained in order to secure natural resources in Manchuria. (3) Japan became a council member of the League of Nations in 1920. Mori understood this to mean that Japan was responsible for preserving order in East Asia, and on the basis of this understanding, he reasoned the powers would accept Japanese military action to maintain order in Manchuria under the conditions mentioned above (1). (4) Mori viewed the Japanese state as a "nation state based on the Imperial Household, " and understood the communist movement as threatening the Imperial Household. Therefore communism could not be tolerated and the spread of communist forces into Manchuria must be prevented. This was because an intrusion into Manchuria would mean its spread into Japan. The infringement on Japanese national interests in mainland China by communist forces in early 1927 and the revolutionary foreign policy by the communism elements in Chinese nationalist government solidified his view of communism. Considering the four points noted above, I wish to point out that this paper provides an opportunity to reassess Mori's foreign policy toward China, which most studies have regarded as antithetical to Shidehara's and have viewed negatively by stressing his hard-line stance and conduct. Further study and consideration of Mori's policy can also help us to consider what would have been a possible, alternative Japanese foreign policy to that of Shidehara