<Articles>Japan-Joseon Relations in the Latter Half of the 17th Century and the Tsushima Domain, Focusing on the Negotiations for the Establishment of the Gongendō Annual Ship

幕藩制国家の中で朝鮮との関係を司っていた対馬藩は、貿易に藩財政を依存していた。そして対馬藩は、外交・貿易船である送使の増設を朝鮮側に求めていた。その一環として要請された「権現堂送使」は、朝鮮との国交回復を藩に任せ、両国に平和をもたらした存在とされる東照大権現への供養を名目としたものである。本稿は、この権現堂送使に着目し、その新設交渉の過程から日朝関係における対馬藩と朝鮮側双方の立場を照射する試みである。東照大権現への供養という送使の名分には、幕府の承認を要するが、藩が独自に活用して財政の拡充を目指したことがまず注目される。対馬藩は一旦、朝鮮側と合意に至ったものの、幕府の承諾を得ることはできなくなり、結局権現堂送使の新設を諦めざるを得なかった。しかし、その後も対馬藩は、朝鮮との交渉において権現堂送使を建前とし、藩の利益に関わるその他の外交案件を達成する手段として活用していった。During the Edo period, the economy of Tsushima domain relied heavily on trade with Joseon. To increase trade volume with Joseon, Tsushima planned to establish additional annual ships 送使 that would be dispatched from Tsushima to Joseon and responsible for foreign diplomacy and trade. This article focuses on one such effort, the Gongendō 権現堂 annual ship that Tsushima requested Joseon to initiate. The ostensive purpose of the Banshōin 万松院 annual ship, the precedent for the Gongendō annual ship, had been to donate expenses for condolences to the first lord of the domain, Sō Yoshitoshi, who was recognized by Joseon as the restorer of amicable relations between the two states. Tsushima in similar fashion requested that Joseon institute an annual ship for the Gongendō (the Tsushima Tōshōgū), the professed purpose of which would be to cover the cost of offerings to Tōshō Daigongen, who was regarded as having brought about peace between the two countries. Strikingly, although it should have required the approval of the bakufu, Tsushima arbitrarily used the rationale of the Joseon's condolences to Tōshō Daigongen as an excuse to increase trade. Meanwhile, since the addition of annual ships would mean a greater trade deficit, Joseon refused Tsushima's request. Hence, Tsushima first asked that Joseon's interpreter-envoys 訳官使 and diplomatic missions 通信使 make a pilgrimage to the Gongendō. This was to gain legitimacy for the institution of the Gongendō annual ship through the establishment of official rites conducted by Joseon at the Gongendō. Well aware of Tsushima's intentions, Joseon opposed this and the plan failed. After persistent requests, Tsushima finally succeeded in obtaining Joseon's agreement to establish the Gongendō annual ship. However, as the bakufu's attitude towards the Joseon diplomatic missions and Tōshōgū had grown lukewarm, it became unclear whether Tsushima could successfully obtain the bakufu's approval of the new annual ship for the Gongendō. Accordingly, Tsushima had no choice but to abandon its plan for the establishment of the Gongendō annual ship. Despite all of this, Tsushima continually requested that Joseon add the amount of trade that would have been previously approved by Joseon. Tsushima claimed it was difficult to receive authorization from the bakufu as the current amount of trade sanctioned by Joseon was inappropriate for a shrine for the late Shōgun. Knowing that the Gongendō annual ship was merely for the benefit of Tsushima, Joseon rejected Tsushima's plea. Consequently, the negotiations remained deadlocked. However, the true objective of Tsushima was to use the negotiations surrounding the Gongendō annual ship to gain advantage in other diplomatic matters. In the latter half of the 17th century, issues pertinent to Tsushima's interests, such as relocation of the Japan House 倭館 and the payment of official trading rice 公作米, were being negotiated with Joseon. Moreover, in this period, talks related to the repatriation of the Dutch and the case of a smuggling ship 抜船 were also in progress with Joseon by order of the bakufu. Knowing that issue of the Gongendō annual ship was the most burdensome one for Joseon, Tsushima took advantage of this, using it as a diplomatic card to pressure Joseon. Indeed, whilst Joseon stubbornly refused to establish the Gongendō annual ship, it had no choice but to agree on other matters. Furthermore, Tsushima claimed that initiation of the Gongendō annual ship was the order of the shōgun, and used this as an excuse to achieve other goals. Without approval from the bakufu, Tsushima still employed the issue of providing offerings for Tōshō Daigongen as a tool to serve its own interests. In sum, whilst taking charge of diplomatic issues and trade relations with Joseon on behalf of the bakufu, Tsushima simultaneously satisfied its own interests. Thus, we can identify in these actions the autonomy of the Tsushima domain