Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial negotiation and possible agreement to become feasible. Even in a full-information world, if the distribution of these costs is sufficiently mismatched with the distribution of the parties’ bargaining powers, a pretrial agreement may never be reached even though litigation is overall wasteful. Our results shed light on two key issues. First, a plaintiff may initiate a lawsuit even though the parties fully anticipate that it will be settled out of court. Second, the likelihood that a given lawsuit goes to trial is unaffected by how trial costs are distributed among the litigants. The choice of fee-shifting rule can affect only whether the plai...
Litigation costs could be conceived as a bribe to parties to reach a contractual agreement settling ...
It is by now axiomatic that the objective of the civil lawsuit has evolved. Litigants no longer rout...
This paper reviews the use of cost shifting devices intended to encourage pre-trial settlement. Both...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation, or ''fee-shifting'' rules, provide...
Parties engaged in a litigation generally enter the discovery process with different informations re...
A persistently troubling question in the legal-economic literature is why cases proceed to trial. Li...
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows...
Why do agents engage in costly dispute resolution such as litigation and arbitration when costless s...
Lengthy legal procedures and high legal costs are among the main drawbacks of the current litigation...
The different interests of the plaintiff and the defendant represent the fundamental mechanism that ...
This article is partially based on a study in which I interviewed respected lawyers about their nego...
This paper analyzes asymmetrically informed litigants' incentives to settle when they anticipate the...
This article identifies the basis and limits of the parties\u27 abilities to define and enforce disc...
Litigation costs could be conceived as a bribe to parties to reach a contractual agreement settling ...
It is by now axiomatic that the objective of the civil lawsuit has evolved. Litigants no longer rout...
This paper reviews the use of cost shifting devices intended to encourage pre-trial settlement. Both...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation, or ''fee-shifting'' rules, provide...
Parties engaged in a litigation generally enter the discovery process with different informations re...
A persistently troubling question in the legal-economic literature is why cases proceed to trial. Li...
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows...
Why do agents engage in costly dispute resolution such as litigation and arbitration when costless s...
Lengthy legal procedures and high legal costs are among the main drawbacks of the current litigation...
The different interests of the plaintiff and the defendant represent the fundamental mechanism that ...
This article is partially based on a study in which I interviewed respected lawyers about their nego...
This paper analyzes asymmetrically informed litigants' incentives to settle when they anticipate the...
This article identifies the basis and limits of the parties\u27 abilities to define and enforce disc...
Litigation costs could be conceived as a bribe to parties to reach a contractual agreement settling ...
It is by now axiomatic that the objective of the civil lawsuit has evolved. Litigants no longer rout...
This paper reviews the use of cost shifting devices intended to encourage pre-trial settlement. Both...