Add to ORKGA persistently troubling question in the legal-economic literature is why cases proceed to trial. Litigation is a negative-sum proposition for the litigants-the longer the process continues, the lower their aggregate wealth. Although civil litigation is resolved by settlement in an estimated 95 percent of all disputes, what accounts for the failure of the remaining 5 percent to settle prior to trial
The traditional economic model of settlement breakdown -- as developed by Priest and Klein -- provid...
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know ...
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know ...
When court trials (or arbitration) are the mechanisms for resolving bargaining impasses, the costs...
This paper analyzes asymmetrically informed litigants' incentives to settle when they anticipate the...
This paper analyzes asymmetrically informed litigants' incentives to settle when they anticipate the...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows...
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows...
The traditional economic model of settlement breakdown -- as developed by Priest and Klein -- provid...
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know ...
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know ...
When court trials (or arbitration) are the mechanisms for resolving bargaining impasses, the costs...
This paper analyzes asymmetrically informed litigants' incentives to settle when they anticipate the...
This paper analyzes asymmetrically informed litigants' incentives to settle when they anticipate the...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows...
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows...
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial...
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows...
The traditional economic model of settlement breakdown -- as developed by Priest and Klein -- provid...
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know ...
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know ...