<p>Left: probability of switching to another strategy depending on the payoff differences for both the spatial and non spatial experiment. The payoff difference is between the focal player and the best player of the opposite strategy. The results are consistent with imitating the neighbors with higher payoffs. However this imitation is not unconditional, but the higher the payoff difference the larger is the probability of imitation. In addition, players might spontaneously switch their strategies even if they have no neighbors playing the other strategy, resembling mutations. Error bars are the standard deviations of a binomial distribution, , where is the number of samples and is the probability of changing the action). Right: Probabili...
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive p...
Abstract. Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the re¯nement e®ect from the random mutations in the ad...
We consider evolutionary game dynamics in a finite population of size N. When mutations are rare, th...
<p>The main panels show three different type of data: the fraction of inferred imitations, the level...
The emergence and abundance of cooperation in animal and human societies is a challenging puzzle to ...
This paper analyzes the equilibrium play of individuals that are randomly matched to play a contest ...
In this paper, we study analytically the statistics of the number of equilibria in pairwise social d...
<p>The graphs show two typical simulation runs for a population of size 100. At the beginning of eac...
Each row corresponds to one game type. Across all game types, the reward probabilities were 20% if t...
<p>In rare-mutation treatments, the mutation rate is set to , whereas in frequent-mutation treatment...
Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with...
We study the evolutionary dynamics of strategies in finite populations which are homogeneous and wel...
Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with...
<p>‘Best’ rule - players imitate the best player (i.e. the neighbor with the highest payoff). ‘Best ...
Abstract. Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the re¯nement e®ect from the random mutations in the ad...
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive p...
Abstract. Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the re¯nement e®ect from the random mutations in the ad...
We consider evolutionary game dynamics in a finite population of size N. When mutations are rare, th...
<p>The main panels show three different type of data: the fraction of inferred imitations, the level...
The emergence and abundance of cooperation in animal and human societies is a challenging puzzle to ...
This paper analyzes the equilibrium play of individuals that are randomly matched to play a contest ...
In this paper, we study analytically the statistics of the number of equilibria in pairwise social d...
<p>The graphs show two typical simulation runs for a population of size 100. At the beginning of eac...
Each row corresponds to one game type. Across all game types, the reward probabilities were 20% if t...
<p>In rare-mutation treatments, the mutation rate is set to , whereas in frequent-mutation treatment...
Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with...
We study the evolutionary dynamics of strategies in finite populations which are homogeneous and wel...
Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with...
<p>‘Best’ rule - players imitate the best player (i.e. the neighbor with the highest payoff). ‘Best ...
Abstract. Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the re¯nement e®ect from the random mutations in the ad...
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive p...
Abstract. Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the re¯nement e®ect from the random mutations in the ad...
We consider evolutionary game dynamics in a finite population of size N. When mutations are rare, th...