Fixation of strategies driven by switching probabilities in evolutionary games

We study the evolutionary dynamics of strategies in finite populations which are homogeneous and well mixed by means of the pairwise comparison process, the core of which is the proposed switching probability. Previous studies about this subject are usually based on the known payoff comparison of the related players, which is an ideal assumption. In real social systems, acquiring the accurate payoffs of partners at each round of interaction may be not easy. So we bypass the need of explicit knowledge of payoffs, and encode the payoffs into the willingness of any individual shift from her current strategy to the competing one, and the switching probabilities are wholly independent of payoffs. Along this way, the strategy updating can be performed when game models are fixed and payoffs are unclear, expected to extend ideal assumptions to be more realistic one. We explore the impact of the switching probability on the fixation probability and derive a simple formula which determines the fixation probability. Moreover we find that cooperation dominates defection if the probability of cooperation replacing defection is always larger than the probability of defection replacing cooperation in finite populations. Last, we investigate the influences of model parameters on the fixation of strategies in the framework of three concrete game models: prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift game and stag-hunt game, which effectively portray the characteristics of cooperative dilemmas in real social systems