David Eaton and Timothy Pickavance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and interesting consequence. They take this consequence to be so implausible that it refutes interest-relative invariantism. But in fact it is a consequence that any theory of knowledge that has the resources to explain familiar puzzles (such as Gettier cases) must have.PostprintPeer reviewe
According to the probabilistic relevance account of confirmation, E confirms H relative to backgroun...
Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical...
This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know o...
David Eaton and Timothy Pickavance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and i...
According to Interest-Relative Invariantism, whether an agent knows that p, or possesses other sorts...
Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of cer...
Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI hereafter) is the view that a person’s practical interests encro...
Interest-relative invariantism conjoins the interest-relativist thesis that knowledge depends in par...
The principle of Counter-Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed so...
In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005),...
In this essay, I shall briefly present Epistemic Contextualism (EC), Invariantism and Interest- Rela...
Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists often cite the knowledge norm of assertion as par...
Some philosophers have recently argued that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge in a specific...
According to the probabilistic relevance account of confirmation, E confirms H relative to backgroun...
Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical...
This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know o...
David Eaton and Timothy Pickavance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and i...
According to Interest-Relative Invariantism, whether an agent knows that p, or possesses other sorts...
Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of cer...
Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI hereafter) is the view that a person’s practical interests encro...
Interest-relative invariantism conjoins the interest-relativist thesis that knowledge depends in par...
The principle of Counter-Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed so...
In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005),...
In this essay, I shall briefly present Epistemic Contextualism (EC), Invariantism and Interest- Rela...
Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists often cite the knowledge norm of assertion as par...
Some philosophers have recently argued that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge in a specific...
According to the probabilistic relevance account of confirmation, E confirms H relative to backgroun...
Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical...
This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know o...