Add to ORKGContextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists often cite the knowledge norm of assertion as part of their argument. They claim that the knowledge norms in conjunction with our intuitions about when a subject is properly asserting in low or high stakes contexts provides strong evidence that what counts as knowledge depends on practical factors. In this paper, I present new data to suggest they are mistaken in the way they think about cases involving high and low stakes and I show how insensitive invariantists can explain the data. I exploit recent work done on the distinction between flouting a norm and being blamed for that violation to formulate a rigorous theory of rational expected blameworthiness that allows insensitive invariantis...
Though many philosophers agree that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, there is d...
Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical...
In this paper, I present a counter-example to the two most prominent theories of pragmatic encroachm...
Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists often cite the knowledge norm of assertion as par...
One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in ...
Many philosophers hold that stakes affect ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Here’s a version of a pai...
In Knowledge and its Limits (KAIL), Timothy Williamson argues for the view that “only knowledge warr...
Epistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by...
One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in ...
Though many philosophers agree that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, there is d...
Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical...
In this paper, I present a counter-example to the two most prominent theories of pragmatic encroachm...
Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists often cite the knowledge norm of assertion as par...
One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in ...
Many philosophers hold that stakes affect ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Here’s a version of a pai...
In Knowledge and its Limits (KAIL), Timothy Williamson argues for the view that “only knowledge warr...
Epistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by...
One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in ...
Though many philosophers agree that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, there is d...
Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical...
In this paper, I present a counter-example to the two most prominent theories of pragmatic encroachm...