Add to ORKGInvestigating the relationship between CEO compensation and firm diversification over 1985-1990, we find that the CEO of a firm with two lines of business averages 13% more in salary and bonus than the CEO of a similar-sized but undiversified firm, ceteris paribus. We explore two potential explanations for this: the match of higher-ability CEOs with firms that are more difficult to manage, and the association of diversification with CEO entrenchment. The data are more consistent with ability matching: the premium is invariant to CEO tenure, and incumbents who diversify their firms earn less than newly hired CEOs at already-diversified firms.
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have dif-ferent talents and are matc...
In the ‘size of stakes ’ view quantitatively formalised in Gabaix and Landier (2008), CEO compensati...
This paper examines the relation between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) incentive levels and thei...
We explore the relation between corporate diversijication and CEO com-pensation. We document that ge...
The purpose of this research is to examine CEO salary and to explore whether the independent variabl...
CEO compensation varies widely, even within industries. In this paper, we investigate whether diffe...
The purpose of this study is to extend research devoted to the areas of organizational size and chie...
Research has shown that generalist CEOs enjoy higher pay than do specialist CEOs. However, the impl...
Do chief executive officers (CEOs) really matter? Do cross-sectional differences in firm performance...
Specifically, we compare CEO turnover in diversified versus focused firms. We find that CEO turnover...
We examine the distinct effects of generalist–specialist versus insider–outsider attributes on Chief...
We examine how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity ownership, CEO tenure, and the percentage of opt...
Do chief executive officers (CEOs) really matter? Do cross-sectional differences in firm performance...
This paper examines the similarity of firms’ CEO compensation contracts among industry peers. We fin...
Economics, 121(1):49–100, 2008), CEO compensation reflects the size of firms affected by talent in a...
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have dif-ferent talents and are matc...
In the ‘size of stakes ’ view quantitatively formalised in Gabaix and Landier (2008), CEO compensati...
This paper examines the relation between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) incentive levels and thei...
We explore the relation between corporate diversijication and CEO com-pensation. We document that ge...
The purpose of this research is to examine CEO salary and to explore whether the independent variabl...
CEO compensation varies widely, even within industries. In this paper, we investigate whether diffe...
The purpose of this study is to extend research devoted to the areas of organizational size and chie...
Research has shown that generalist CEOs enjoy higher pay than do specialist CEOs. However, the impl...
Do chief executive officers (CEOs) really matter? Do cross-sectional differences in firm performance...
Specifically, we compare CEO turnover in diversified versus focused firms. We find that CEO turnover...
We examine the distinct effects of generalist–specialist versus insider–outsider attributes on Chief...
We examine how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity ownership, CEO tenure, and the percentage of opt...
Do chief executive officers (CEOs) really matter? Do cross-sectional differences in firm performance...
This paper examines the similarity of firms’ CEO compensation contracts among industry peers. We fin...
Economics, 121(1):49–100, 2008), CEO compensation reflects the size of firms affected by talent in a...
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have dif-ferent talents and are matc...
In the ‘size of stakes ’ view quantitatively formalised in Gabaix and Landier (2008), CEO compensati...
This paper examines the relation between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) incentive levels and thei...