This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border mergers in industries with a vertical structure. Absent free trade, in a vertically related industry, the downstream firms will not choose the social optimum under spatial price discrimination when none of the downstream firms produce all the varieties that consumers demand. We show that free trade will induce the downstream firms to gravitate toward the social optimum but an upstream merger across borders, under free trade, will pull the downstream firms away from the social optimum back to their autarkic positions.Product-differentiation, Price-discrimination, Spatialcompetition, Firm-location, Cross-border Merger
We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration in a model with oligopolistic fi...
We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives f...
We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key ...
This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical ...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
This paper shows that dominant firms may wish to encourage competition in vertically-related markets...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
Contrary to the seminal paper of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), we demonstrate that upstream firms, which...
This paper develops an equilibrium model of vertical mergers. We show that competition on an upstrea...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
A common justification that economists have historically given for why competition authorities shoul...
We develop a model of vertical merger waves leading to input foreclosure. When all upstream firms be...
We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration in a model with oligopolistic fi...
We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives f...
We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key ...
This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical ...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
This paper shows that dominant firms may wish to encourage competition in vertically-related markets...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
Contrary to the seminal paper of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), we demonstrate that upstream firms, which...
This paper develops an equilibrium model of vertical mergers. We show that competition on an upstrea...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
A common justification that economists have historically given for why competition authorities shoul...
We develop a model of vertical merger waves leading to input foreclosure. When all upstream firms be...
We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration in a model with oligopolistic fi...
We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives f...
We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key ...