Add to ORKGWe demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded
We consider a vertically structured market with two retail firms of mixed ownership competing agains...
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at som...
AbstractMost regional literature focuses on competition among final goods, but little of it integrat...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border...
We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical ...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its re...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This is a successive oligopoly model with two brands. Each downstream firm chooses one brand to sell...
We analyze a model of a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions. These two locations diff...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can diffe...
We consider a vertically structured market with two retail firms of mixed ownership competing agains...
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at som...
AbstractMost regional literature focuses on competition among final goods, but little of it integrat...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border...
We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical ...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its re...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This is a successive oligopoly model with two brands. Each downstream firm chooses one brand to sell...
We analyze a model of a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions. These two locations diff...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can diffe...
We consider a vertically structured market with two retail firms of mixed ownership competing agains...
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at som...
AbstractMost regional literature focuses on competition among final goods, but little of it integrat...