We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical merger with a monopoly upstream will induce each downstream firm (inside and out of the merger) to deviate from the socially optimal location.Product-differentiationPrice-discrimination Spatial-competition Firm-location Merger
In an industry characterized by secret vertical contracts, we consider a benchmark case where two ve...
We study the incentives of final product manufacturers to introduce new products into the market and...
Contrary to the seminal paper of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), we demonstrate that upstream firms, which...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
We study a new channel of downstream rent extraction through vertical integration: competition for i...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
The effects of merger have usually been examined in the context of homogeneous goods, and are unambi...
[Paper received in nal form, June 1999] Summary. This paper studies the relationship between merger...
We study horizontal mergers in a network products market with a three-firm model of spatial competit...
Rooted in the economics of industrial organization, the principle of differentiation ranks as one of...
This paper analyzes the effects of horizontal mergers on innovation and consumer welfare in a vertic...
This paper analyses the impact of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff an...
In an industry characterized by secret vertical contracts, we consider a benchmark case where two ve...
We study the incentives of final product manufacturers to introduce new products into the market and...
Contrary to the seminal paper of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), we demonstrate that upstream firms, which...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
We study a new channel of downstream rent extraction through vertical integration: competition for i...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
The effects of merger have usually been examined in the context of homogeneous goods, and are unambi...
[Paper received in nal form, June 1999] Summary. This paper studies the relationship between merger...
We study horizontal mergers in a network products market with a three-firm model of spatial competit...
Rooted in the economics of industrial organization, the principle of differentiation ranks as one of...
This paper analyzes the effects of horizontal mergers on innovation and consumer welfare in a vertic...
This paper analyses the impact of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff an...
In an industry characterized by secret vertical contracts, we consider a benchmark case where two ve...
We study the incentives of final product manufacturers to introduce new products into the market and...
Contrary to the seminal paper of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), we demonstrate that upstream firms, which...