We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) [22] and Milgrom and Stokey (1982) [32]) by allowing the final payoff of the asset being traded to depend on an action taken by its eventual owner. We characterize conditions under which equilibria with trade exist.Information Trade Speculative trade No-trade theorems
Abstract: We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that g...
We study the value of information in a competitive economy in which agents trade in asset markets to...
Abstract: In this paper we analyze with game-theoretic tools economic situations where two players k...
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses...
Abstract: The famous no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey [5] is often used to argue that in ongoin...
We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pare...
Abstract: In [Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980], it is argued that in a rational expectations setting the...
\No Trade " Theorems claim that the mere arrival of new information can not induce trade betwee...
We study the proposition thnt if it 1s common knowledge that en allocation of assets 1s ex-ante pare...
'No trade' theorems have shown that new information will not lead to trade when agents share the sam...
In this thesis, I have examined the models of dynamic competitive behavior on trading information. T...
We investigate, in a simple bilateral bargaining environment, the extent to which asymmetric informa...
∗We would like to thank Alex Citanna, Andy Postlewaite, Antonio Villanacci, and especially Atsushi K...
We construct laboratory financial markets in which subjects can trade an asset whose value is unknow...
Intuitively, a patient trader should be able to make his trading partners compete to reveal whatever...
Abstract: We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that g...
We study the value of information in a competitive economy in which agents trade in asset markets to...
Abstract: In this paper we analyze with game-theoretic tools economic situations where two players k...
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses...
Abstract: The famous no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey [5] is often used to argue that in ongoin...
We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pare...
Abstract: In [Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980], it is argued that in a rational expectations setting the...
\No Trade " Theorems claim that the mere arrival of new information can not induce trade betwee...
We study the proposition thnt if it 1s common knowledge that en allocation of assets 1s ex-ante pare...
'No trade' theorems have shown that new information will not lead to trade when agents share the sam...
In this thesis, I have examined the models of dynamic competitive behavior on trading information. T...
We investigate, in a simple bilateral bargaining environment, the extent to which asymmetric informa...
∗We would like to thank Alex Citanna, Andy Postlewaite, Antonio Villanacci, and especially Atsushi K...
We construct laboratory financial markets in which subjects can trade an asset whose value is unknow...
Intuitively, a patient trader should be able to make his trading partners compete to reveal whatever...
Abstract: We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that g...
We study the value of information in a competitive economy in which agents trade in asset markets to...
Abstract: In this paper we analyze with game-theoretic tools economic situations where two players k...