Add to ORKGAbstract: We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that gains from trade are common knowledge nor that play is a Nash equilibrium. 1 We thank Felipe Zurita for comments and encouragement. We are grateful to NSF grants SES-01-12018, SES-03-14713, and SES-04-26199 for financial support
AbstractThis paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between form...
This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model in which the buyer’s valuation for the object is uncerta...
The paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of lear...
The theory of learning in games studies how, which and what kind of equilibria might arise as a cons...
This paper explores the extent to which people learn in repeated games without feedback, and the ext...
An important issue in the field of learning is to what extent one can distinguish between behavior r...
We construct laboratory financial markets in which subjects can trade an asset whose value is unknow...
We investigate, in a simple bilateral bargaining environment, the extent to which asymmetric informa...
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses...
This paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of lea...
Psychologically based rules are important in human behavior and have the potential of explaining equ...
We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and belie...
Empirical studies of games typically rely on Nash Equilibrium. However, such solution concept is rej...
Abstract: The famous no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey [5] is often used to argue that in ongoin...
We present a parametric learning model of players' dynamic and possibly out-of-equilibrium beliefs a...
AbstractThis paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between form...
This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model in which the buyer’s valuation for the object is uncerta...
The paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of lear...
The theory of learning in games studies how, which and what kind of equilibria might arise as a cons...
This paper explores the extent to which people learn in repeated games without feedback, and the ext...
An important issue in the field of learning is to what extent one can distinguish between behavior r...
We construct laboratory financial markets in which subjects can trade an asset whose value is unknow...
We investigate, in a simple bilateral bargaining environment, the extent to which asymmetric informa...
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses...
This paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of lea...
Psychologically based rules are important in human behavior and have the potential of explaining equ...
We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and belie...
Empirical studies of games typically rely on Nash Equilibrium. However, such solution concept is rej...
Abstract: The famous no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey [5] is often used to argue that in ongoin...
We present a parametric learning model of players' dynamic and possibly out-of-equilibrium beliefs a...
AbstractThis paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between form...
This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model in which the buyer’s valuation for the object is uncerta...
The paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of lear...