We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982)) by allowing the final payoff of the asset being traded to depend on an action taken by its eventual owner. We characterize conditions under which equilibria with trade exist
This thesis develops a theory of endogenous information asymmetry in dynamic financial markets. The ...
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who ...
We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is ...
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses...
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses...
We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with correlated assets owned by privately infor...
Abstract: In [Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980], it is argued that in a rational expectations setting the...
Abstract We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and co...
University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. June 2018. Major: Economics. Advisors: Jan Werner, David...
Abstract Costly information acquisition is introduced into a dynamic trading model of Glosten and M...
Two ex ante identically informed agents play a double auction over the division of a trading surplus...
This paper, in a Shapley-Shubik market game framework, examines the effect of "leakage" of informati...
Asymmetric information can impede socially efficient trade in bilateral transactions. This dissertat...
We study economies with multiple assets that are valued both for their return and liquidity. Exchang...
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who ...
This thesis develops a theory of endogenous information asymmetry in dynamic financial markets. The ...
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who ...
We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is ...
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses...
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses...
We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with correlated assets owned by privately infor...
Abstract: In [Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980], it is argued that in a rational expectations setting the...
Abstract We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and co...
University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. June 2018. Major: Economics. Advisors: Jan Werner, David...
Abstract Costly information acquisition is introduced into a dynamic trading model of Glosten and M...
Two ex ante identically informed agents play a double auction over the division of a trading surplus...
This paper, in a Shapley-Shubik market game framework, examines the effect of "leakage" of informati...
Asymmetric information can impede socially efficient trade in bilateral transactions. This dissertat...
We study economies with multiple assets that are valued both for their return and liquidity. Exchang...
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who ...
This thesis develops a theory of endogenous information asymmetry in dynamic financial markets. The ...
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who ...
We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is ...
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