How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium
A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium se...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the pa...
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the pa...
Many recent macroeconomic models exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Many (i...
Many recent macroeconomic models exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Many (i...
Abstract In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually ...
How coordination can be achieved in isolated, one-shot interactions without com-munication and in th...
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' o...
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' o...
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a departure...
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a departure...
A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium se...
A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium se...
A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium se...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the pa...
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the pa...
Many recent macroeconomic models exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Many (i...
Many recent macroeconomic models exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Many (i...
Abstract In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually ...
How coordination can be achieved in isolated, one-shot interactions without com-munication and in th...
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' o...
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' o...
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a departure...
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a departure...
A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium se...
A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium se...
A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium se...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
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