Add to ORKGHow do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player’s utility maximization among his strategies does not ground coordination. What background conditions and principles of rationality suffice? This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts leads to a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium. It uses principles of individualistic reasoning to justify a method of initiating coordination. Its account of strategic reasoning elaborates a classical treatment of coordination
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a departure...
A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium se...
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the pa...
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the pa...
Abstract In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually ...
How coordination can be achieved in isolated, one-shot interactions without com-munication and in th...
Many recent macroeconomic models exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Many (i...
Many recent macroeconomic models exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Many (i...
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' o...
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' o...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a departure...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a departure...
A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium se...
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the pa...
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the pa...
Abstract In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually ...
How coordination can be achieved in isolated, one-shot interactions without com-munication and in th...
Many recent macroeconomic models exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Many (i...
Many recent macroeconomic models exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Many (i...
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' o...
We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' o...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a departure...
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal o...
Coordination on focal points in one shot games can often be explained by team reasoning, a departure...
A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium se...