This paper illustrates how a deterministic approximation of a stochastic process can be usefully applied to analyse the dynamics of many simple simulation models. To demonstrate the type of results that can be obtained using this approximation, we present two illustrative examples which are meant to serve as methodological references for researchers exploring this area. Finally, we prove some convergence results for simulations of a family of evolutionary games, namely, intra-population imitation models in n-player games with arbitrary payoffs.Ministerio de Educación (JC2009- 00263), Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010: CSD2010-00034, DPI2010-16920
Imitation dynamics in population games are a class of evolutionary game-theoretic models, widely use...
Imitation dynamics in population games are a class of evolutionary game-theoretic models, widely use...
International audienceWe consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics to learn equilibria in...
This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when fin...
We here establish an upper bound on the probability for deviations of a Markov population process fr...
We here establish an upper bound on the probability for deviations of a Markov population process fr...
This paper provides a general framework for the simulation of stochastic dynamic models. Our analysi...
Stochastic evolutionary games often share a dynamic property called punctuated equilibrium; this mea...
This thesis makes two extensions to the standard stochastic approximation framework in order to stud...
In order to understand the development of non-genetically encoded actions during an animal's lifespa...
We derive continuous approximations of stochastic evolutionary dynamics in games. Depending on how w...
Consider a game that is played repeatedly by two populations of agents. In fictitious play, agents l...
Dawid H. Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: The long run, ...
AbstractThe standard methods of generating sample from univariate distributions often become hopeles...
Imitation dynamics in population games are a class of evolutionary game-theoretic models, widely use...
Imitation dynamics in population games are a class of evolutionary game-theoretic models, widely use...
Imitation dynamics in population games are a class of evolutionary game-theoretic models, widely use...
International audienceWe consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics to learn equilibria in...
This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when fin...
We here establish an upper bound on the probability for deviations of a Markov population process fr...
We here establish an upper bound on the probability for deviations of a Markov population process fr...
This paper provides a general framework for the simulation of stochastic dynamic models. Our analysi...
Stochastic evolutionary games often share a dynamic property called punctuated equilibrium; this mea...
This thesis makes two extensions to the standard stochastic approximation framework in order to stud...
In order to understand the development of non-genetically encoded actions during an animal's lifespa...
We derive continuous approximations of stochastic evolutionary dynamics in games. Depending on how w...
Consider a game that is played repeatedly by two populations of agents. In fictitious play, agents l...
Dawid H. Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: The long run, ...
AbstractThe standard methods of generating sample from univariate distributions often become hopeles...
Imitation dynamics in population games are a class of evolutionary game-theoretic models, widely use...
Imitation dynamics in population games are a class of evolutionary game-theoretic models, widely use...
Imitation dynamics in population games are a class of evolutionary game-theoretic models, widely use...
International audienceWe consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics to learn equilibria in...