Alcuni pregi e limiti della teoria cognitivista della metafora

The so-called cognitivist theory of metaphor, proposed by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson in Metaphors we live by (1980), undoubtedly represents the major innovation in recent research on metaphor. Since its appearance, cognitivist theory has received both enthusiastic support and severe criticism. Without claiming to offer in a few pages a global evaluation of Lakoff and Johnson's theory, this paper tries to outline some merits and limits of the cognitivist approach to metaphor. The capacity showed by the cognitivist theory in individuating, describing, and tentatively motivating, the strong conceptual regularities underlying metaphorical language is illustrated through the paradigmatic case of idioms. Two problematic aspects of the cognitivist approach are then briefly discussed: first, the issue concerning its effective psychological validity, and secondly its prevailing (if not even exclusive) interest in the conceptual dimension of metaphor to the detriment of the specifically linguistic one.1n