Add to ORKGThis paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence’s meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face
The redundancy view of truth states generally that the truth-predicate “is true ” does not express a...
We begin with the hypothetical assumption that Tarski’s 1933 formula ∀ True(x) φ(x) has been defined...
Abstract: Many, if not most philosophers, deny that a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could b...
This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumpti...
In this article we discuss the issue of ‘self-reference’, i.e., the question whether (or in which se...
Semantic pathologies of self-reference include the Liar ('this sentence is false'), the Truth-Teller...
Abstract We provide a systematic recipe for eliminating self-reference from a sim-ple language in wh...
Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they ha...
I put forward precise and appealing notions of reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness for s...
As a reaction to Dorothy Grover and Robert Brandom, this paper examines semantic concerns about intr...
1. Competition between philosophical theories of linguistic meaning is sometimes specious. For examp...
Self-reference is used to denote any situation in which someone or something refers to itself. Objec...
This book proposes a novel theory of truth and falsity. It argues that truth is a form of reference ...
Liar and truth-teller sentence in the classical logics of truth and falsehoodAdding the content impl...
In this paper I try to show that semantics can explain word-to-world relations and that sentences ca...
The redundancy view of truth states generally that the truth-predicate “is true ” does not express a...
We begin with the hypothetical assumption that Tarski’s 1933 formula ∀ True(x) φ(x) has been defined...
Abstract: Many, if not most philosophers, deny that a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could b...
This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumpti...
In this article we discuss the issue of ‘self-reference’, i.e., the question whether (or in which se...
Semantic pathologies of self-reference include the Liar ('this sentence is false'), the Truth-Teller...
Abstract We provide a systematic recipe for eliminating self-reference from a sim-ple language in wh...
Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they ha...
I put forward precise and appealing notions of reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness for s...
As a reaction to Dorothy Grover and Robert Brandom, this paper examines semantic concerns about intr...
1. Competition between philosophical theories of linguistic meaning is sometimes specious. For examp...
Self-reference is used to denote any situation in which someone or something refers to itself. Objec...
This book proposes a novel theory of truth and falsity. It argues that truth is a form of reference ...
Liar and truth-teller sentence in the classical logics of truth and falsehoodAdding the content impl...
In this paper I try to show that semantics can explain word-to-world relations and that sentences ca...
The redundancy view of truth states generally that the truth-predicate “is true ” does not express a...
We begin with the hypothetical assumption that Tarski’s 1933 formula ∀ True(x) φ(x) has been defined...
Abstract: Many, if not most philosophers, deny that a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could b...