Add to ORKGWe investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant (abbrv. CC) systems. Our study focuses on (nearly) single-peaked resp. single-crossing preferences. We show that for single-crossing approval preferences, winner determination of the Monroe rule is polynomial, and for both rules, winner determination mostly admits FPT algorithms with respect to the number of voters to delete to obtain single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. Our results answer some complexity questions from the literature [18, 28, 21].Comment: A conference version appeared in ECAI 202
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
In a voting system, sometimes multiple new alternatives will jointhe election after the voters’ pref...
The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidate...
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe ...
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections un...
We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two classic fully...
The winner determination problems of many attractive multi-winner voting rules are NP-complete. Howe...
This paper attacks a problem like the one addressed in an earlier work (Potthoff, 2013) but is more...
A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree str...
In their groundbreaking paper, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [1] ar-gued that many well-known voting ru...
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to select m...
Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform...
In their groundbreaking paper, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [6] argued that many well-known voting rul...
We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three-candidate elections. We consider t...
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
In a voting system, sometimes multiple new alternatives will jointhe election after the voters’ pref...
The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidate...
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe ...
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections un...
We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two classic fully...
The winner determination problems of many attractive multi-winner voting rules are NP-complete. Howe...
This paper attacks a problem like the one addressed in an earlier work (Potthoff, 2013) but is more...
A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree str...
In their groundbreaking paper, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [1] ar-gued that many well-known voting ru...
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to select m...
Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform...
In their groundbreaking paper, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [6] argued that many well-known voting rul...
We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three-candidate elections. We consider t...
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
In a voting system, sometimes multiple new alternatives will jointhe election after the voters’ pref...
The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidate...