Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform a sequence of pairwise majority comparisons between two candidates. The winner thus depends on the chosen sequence of comparisons, which can be represented by a binary tree. We address the difficulty of computing candidates that win for some trees, and then introduce and study the notion of fair winner, i.e. candidates who win in a balanced tree. We then consider the situation where we lack complete informations about preferences, and determine the computational complexity of computing winners in this case.
AbstractTo make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences...
A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree str...
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe ...
Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform...
Hyderabad, IndePreferences can be aggregated using voting rules.We consider here the family of rules...
In multiagent settings where agents have different preferences, preference aggregation can be an imp...
In sequential majority voting, preferences are aggregated by a sequence of pairwise comparisons (als...
The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically...
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to select m...
We study the computational complexity of the counting version of the Possible-Winner problem for ele...
International audience<p>One main concern of voting theory is to determine a procedure for choosing ...
Sophisticated voting on a binary tree is a common form of voting structure, as exemplified by, for e...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
Sophisticated voting on a binary tree is a common form of voting struc-ture, as exemplified by, for ...
The complexity of the winner determination problem has been studied for almost all common voting rul...
AbstractTo make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences...
A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree str...
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe ...
Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform...
Hyderabad, IndePreferences can be aggregated using voting rules.We consider here the family of rules...
In multiagent settings where agents have different preferences, preference aggregation can be an imp...
In sequential majority voting, preferences are aggregated by a sequence of pairwise comparisons (als...
The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically...
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to select m...
We study the computational complexity of the counting version of the Possible-Winner problem for ele...
International audience<p>One main concern of voting theory is to determine a procedure for choosing ...
Sophisticated voting on a binary tree is a common form of voting structure, as exemplified by, for e...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
Sophisticated voting on a binary tree is a common form of voting struc-ture, as exemplified by, for ...
The complexity of the winner determination problem has been studied for almost all common voting rul...
AbstractTo make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences...
A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree str...
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe ...