Hyderabad, IndePreferences can be aggregated using voting rules.We consider here the family of rules which performa sequence of pairwise majority comparisons between two candidates. The winner thus depends onthe chosen sequence of comparisons, which can berepresented by a binary tree. We address the difficulty of computing candidates that win for sometrees, and then introduce and study the notion offair winner, i.e. candidates who win in a balancedtree. We then consider the situation where we lackcomplete informations about preferences, and determine the computational complexity of computing winners in this case.ouinonouirechercheInternationa
The complexity of the winner determination problem has been studied for almost all common voting rul...
AbstractTo make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences...
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe ...
Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform...
International audienceIn multiagent settings where agents have different preferences, preference agg...
In sequential majority voting, preferences are aggregated by a sequence of pairwise comparisons (als...
We study the computational complexity of the counting version of the Possible-Winner problem for ele...
International audience<p>One main concern of voting theory is to determine a procedure for choosing ...
<p>The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministica...
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to select m...
We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. In s...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree str...
General conclusions relating pairwise tallies with positional (e.g., plurality, antiplurality (``vot...
We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two classic fully...
The complexity of the winner determination problem has been studied for almost all common voting rul...
AbstractTo make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences...
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe ...
Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform...
International audienceIn multiagent settings where agents have different preferences, preference agg...
In sequential majority voting, preferences are aggregated by a sequence of pairwise comparisons (als...
We study the computational complexity of the counting version of the Possible-Winner problem for ele...
International audience<p>One main concern of voting theory is to determine a procedure for choosing ...
<p>The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministica...
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to select m...
We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. In s...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree str...
General conclusions relating pairwise tallies with positional (e.g., plurality, antiplurality (``vot...
We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two classic fully...
The complexity of the winner determination problem has been studied for almost all common voting rul...
AbstractTo make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences...
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe ...