In this paper we explore tax revenue in a regime of widespread corruption in a static and dynamic framework. We prove that the relationship between tax rate and tax collection is not linear. In a static context, this may bring about a Laffer–like behavior of overall tax revenue. A higher tax rate, via higher corruption, may reduce revenues. In a dynamic context, this relationship is inverted: tax revenues are high for low and high tax rates, while low for intermediate tax rates. Furthermore we prove that the relationship between the tax rate and growth is not linear
Cross-country evidence highlights the importance of tax evasion and corruption in determining the si...
Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency ...
Reduction of fiscal evasion may be pursued by introducing incentive schemes for tax inspectors. The ...
In this paper we explore tax revenue in a regime of widespread corruption in a static and dynamic fr...
In this paper we explore tax revenue in a regime of widespread corruption in a static and dynamic fr...
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framew...
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framew...
In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We de...
In this paper, we analyze the interaction between corruption, taxation and economic growth. Our cont...
In a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax rate sets about complicated strategic decision moves b...
How does the presence of corruption affect the optimal mix between consumption and income taxation? ...
We consider a simple economy where self interested taxpayers may have incentives to evade taxes and ...
Cross-country evidence highlights the importance of tax evasion and corruption in determining the si...
Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency ...
Reduction of fiscal evasion may be pursued by introducing incentive schemes for tax inspectors. The ...
In this paper we explore tax revenue in a regime of widespread corruption in a static and dynamic fr...
In this paper we explore tax revenue in a regime of widespread corruption in a static and dynamic fr...
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framew...
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framew...
In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We de...
In this paper, we analyze the interaction between corruption, taxation and economic growth. Our cont...
In a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax rate sets about complicated strategic decision moves b...
How does the presence of corruption affect the optimal mix between consumption and income taxation? ...
We consider a simple economy where self interested taxpayers may have incentives to evade taxes and ...
Cross-country evidence highlights the importance of tax evasion and corruption in determining the si...
Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency ...
Reduction of fiscal evasion may be pursued by introducing incentive schemes for tax inspectors. The ...