Add to ORKGIn a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax rate sets about complicated strategic decision moves by both tax payers as also tax administrators. It is shown that in some circumstances, this may bring about a Laffer like behaviour of overall tax revenue, ie a higher tax rate may result in a smaller net revenue for the government
The standard approach to evaluate the Laffer curve of personal income taxation focuses on the impact...
In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We de...
The fiscal difficulties of LDC's, and the important role for evasion as a part of them, are well-kno...
In a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax rate sets about complicated strategic decision moves b...
ISSN 1173-0854 ISBN 1-9583485-4-5 In a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax rate sets about comp...
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framew...
Tax evasion has been studied intensively in the context of developed countries in which the institut...
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framew...
In this paper we explore tax revenue in a regime of widespread corruption in a static and dynamic fr...
This article models the imperfect detection of tax evasion motivated by the existence of a corrupt t...
Although corruption and tax evasion are distinct and separate problems, they can easily become inter...
Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency ...
Bribe chains arise when a hierarchy of corruptible auditors audits taxpayers. We investigate fine an...
Our framed laboratory experiment analyses the causal relationship between corruption and tax evasion...
Under Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency chan...
The standard approach to evaluate the Laffer curve of personal income taxation focuses on the impact...
In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We de...
The fiscal difficulties of LDC's, and the important role for evasion as a part of them, are well-kno...
In a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax rate sets about complicated strategic decision moves b...
ISSN 1173-0854 ISBN 1-9583485-4-5 In a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax rate sets about comp...
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framew...
Tax evasion has been studied intensively in the context of developed countries in which the institut...
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framew...
In this paper we explore tax revenue in a regime of widespread corruption in a static and dynamic fr...
This article models the imperfect detection of tax evasion motivated by the existence of a corrupt t...
Although corruption and tax evasion are distinct and separate problems, they can easily become inter...
Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency ...
Bribe chains arise when a hierarchy of corruptible auditors audits taxpayers. We investigate fine an...
Our framed laboratory experiment analyses the causal relationship between corruption and tax evasion...
Under Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency chan...
The standard approach to evaluate the Laffer curve of personal income taxation focuses on the impact...
In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We de...
The fiscal difficulties of LDC's, and the important role for evasion as a part of them, are well-kno...