Entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,004 firms from 38 countries in 1990-2006, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, but does not affect investment in non-family firms. Moreover, as the model predicts, inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession
Family firms form the majority of organizations around the world (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003...
Paper presentato al simposio sulla corporate governance dell'European Financial Management a Leeds (...
“Dead money” refers to the potential for the division, reduction, and misallocation of family firm a...
Entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of...
Entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to noncontrolling heirs. The size of ...
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decide...
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides bet...
Family values may play an important role in shaping the organization of businesses and their efficie...
In family firms, the succession of controlling equity stake to next generation is an issue of paramo...
This paper develops a theory of governance and inheritance within family firms based on kin altruism...
Using a unique, hand-collected data sample and panel-data econometric techniques, we analyse the imp...
The government is seeking to encourage business growth to improve the UK’s financial situation, and ...
Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994–2000, we find that family ownership creates va...
Despite the pervasive presence of family business worldwide, especially among small and medium sized...
Family firms form the majority of organizations around the world (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003...
Paper presentato al simposio sulla corporate governance dell'European Financial Management a Leeds (...
“Dead money” refers to the potential for the division, reduction, and misallocation of family firm a...
Entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of...
Entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to noncontrolling heirs. The size of ...
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decide...
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides bet...
Family values may play an important role in shaping the organization of businesses and their efficie...
In family firms, the succession of controlling equity stake to next generation is an issue of paramo...
This paper develops a theory of governance and inheritance within family firms based on kin altruism...
Using a unique, hand-collected data sample and panel-data econometric techniques, we analyse the imp...
The government is seeking to encourage business growth to improve the UK’s financial situation, and ...
Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994–2000, we find that family ownership creates va...
Despite the pervasive presence of family business worldwide, especially among small and medium sized...
Family firms form the majority of organizations around the world (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003...
Paper presentato al simposio sulla corporate governance dell'European Financial Management a Leeds (...
“Dead money” refers to the potential for the division, reduction, and misallocation of family firm a...