International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by terms together with an equational theory, axiomatizing the properties of the cryptographic functions (encryption, exclusive or, . . . ). The analysis of cryptographic protocols requires a precise understanding of the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are usually considered: deducibility and indistinguishability. Those notions are well-studied and several decidability results already exist to deal with a variety of equational theories. Most of the existing results are dedicated to specific equational theories and only few results, especially in the case of indistinguishability, have been obtained for equational theories with associative and...
International audienceWhen formally analyzing security protocols it is often im- portant to express ...
Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators....
Since 1981, a large variety of formal methods for the analysis of cryptographic protocols has evolve...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by term...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usu- ally modeled by te...
Abstract. The analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of proto...
In the analysis of security protocols, the knowledge of attackers is often described in terms of mes...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by term...
AbstractThe analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of protoco...
International audienceThe analysis of security protocols requires reasoning about the knowledge an a...
International audienceOne of the most effective methods developed for the analysis ofsecurity protoc...
International audienceComputational indistinguishability is a key property in cryptography and verif...
We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding wheth...
International audienceIn the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing s...
Abstract. We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deci...
International audienceWhen formally analyzing security protocols it is often im- portant to express ...
Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators....
Since 1981, a large variety of formal methods for the analysis of cryptographic protocols has evolve...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by term...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usu- ally modeled by te...
Abstract. The analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of proto...
In the analysis of security protocols, the knowledge of attackers is often described in terms of mes...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by term...
AbstractThe analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of protoco...
International audienceThe analysis of security protocols requires reasoning about the knowledge an a...
International audienceOne of the most effective methods developed for the analysis ofsecurity protoc...
International audienceComputational indistinguishability is a key property in cryptography and verif...
We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding wheth...
International audienceIn the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing s...
Abstract. We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deci...
International audienceWhen formally analyzing security protocols it is often im- portant to express ...
Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators....
Since 1981, a large variety of formal methods for the analysis of cryptographic protocols has evolve...