International audienceComputational indistinguishability is a key property in cryptography and verification of security protocols. Current tools for proving it rely on cryptographic game transformations. We follow Bana and Comon's approach, axiomatizing what an adversary cannot distinguish. We prove the decidability of a set of first-order axioms which are computationally sound, though incomplete, for protocols with a bounded number of sessions whose security is based on an ind-cca2 encryption scheme. Alternatively, our result can be viewed as the decidability of a family of cryptographic game transformations. Our proof relies on term rewriting and automated deduction techniques
Notre société utilise de nombreux systèmes de communications. Parce que ces systèmes sont omniprésen...
AbstractThe analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of protoco...
Our society extensively relies on communications systems. Because such systems are used to exchange ...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by term...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usu- ally modeled by te...
Abstract. The analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of proto...
Recently, we proposed a technique [1] to define a com-putationally complete symbolic attacker for th...
In the analysis of security protocols, the knowledge of attackers is often described in terms of mes...
International audienceIn the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing s...
International audienceWe consider the problem of computational indistinguishability of protocols. We...
In cryptographic protocols, honest parties would prefer that their security is assured even in prese...
We consider the problem of computational indistinguishability of protocols. We design a symbolic mod...
We consider the problem of verifying the security of finitely many sessions of a protocol that toss...
Abstract. Only very little is known about the automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols for game...
The field of cryptographic protocol verification in the computational model aims at obtaining formal...
Notre société utilise de nombreux systèmes de communications. Parce que ces systèmes sont omniprésen...
AbstractThe analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of protoco...
Our society extensively relies on communications systems. Because such systems are used to exchange ...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by term...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usu- ally modeled by te...
Abstract. The analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of proto...
Recently, we proposed a technique [1] to define a com-putationally complete symbolic attacker for th...
In the analysis of security protocols, the knowledge of attackers is often described in terms of mes...
International audienceIn the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing s...
International audienceWe consider the problem of computational indistinguishability of protocols. We...
In cryptographic protocols, honest parties would prefer that their security is assured even in prese...
We consider the problem of computational indistinguishability of protocols. We design a symbolic mod...
We consider the problem of verifying the security of finitely many sessions of a protocol that toss...
Abstract. Only very little is known about the automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols for game...
The field of cryptographic protocol verification in the computational model aims at obtaining formal...
Notre société utilise de nombreux systèmes de communications. Parce que ces systèmes sont omniprésen...
AbstractThe analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of protoco...
Our society extensively relies on communications systems. Because such systems are used to exchange ...