International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usu- ally modeled by terms together with an equational theory, axiomatiz- ing the properties of the cryptographic functions (encryption, exclusive or, . . . ). The analysis of cryptographic protocols requires a precise un- derstanding of the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are usu- ally considered: deducibility and indistinguishability. Those notions are well-studied and several decidability results already exist to deal with a variety of equational theories. However most of the results are dedicated to specific equational theories. We show that decidability results can be easily combined for any disjoint equational theories: if the deducibility and indist...
We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding wheth...
Abstract. Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic ...
Abstract. We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deci...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usu- ally modeled by te...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by term...
Abstract. The analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of proto...
In the analysis of security protocols, the knowledge of attackers is often described in terms of mes...
AbstractThe analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of protoco...
International audienceThe analysis of security protocols requires reasoning about the knowledge an a...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by term...
International audienceOne of the most effective methods developed for the analysis ofsecurity protoc...
International audienceIn the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing s...
International audienceComputational indistinguishability is a key property in cryptography and verif...
Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators....
150 pagesModern software systems today have increasingly complex security requirements – such as sup...
We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding wheth...
Abstract. Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic ...
Abstract. We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deci...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usu- ally modeled by te...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by term...
Abstract. The analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of proto...
In the analysis of security protocols, the knowledge of attackers is often described in terms of mes...
AbstractThe analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of protoco...
International audienceThe analysis of security protocols requires reasoning about the knowledge an a...
International audienceIn formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by term...
International audienceOne of the most effective methods developed for the analysis ofsecurity protoc...
International audienceIn the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing s...
International audienceComputational indistinguishability is a key property in cryptography and verif...
Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators....
150 pagesModern software systems today have increasingly complex security requirements – such as sup...
We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding wheth...
Abstract. Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic ...
Abstract. We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deci...